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THE MADNESS IS CATCHING: 
TRANSSEXUALITY AND THE CARTESIAN SUBJECT 
Andrew E. Clark 
April 5, 2011 
This project uses the work of Michel Foucault and Lynne Huffer to examine the creation 
of the transsexual subject in 1950s American sexology through the Cartesian subject.  I 
argue that medical professionals utilized the Cartesian subject as a standard to create and 
classify transsexuality as deviant.  Further, through their joining, medicine and 
psychology positioned the transsexual subject in both madness and abnormality.  Such a 
position leaves transsexuals in a subject position that cannot speak for itself and requires 
medical qualification.  I demonstrate how such a subject position, created through 
medicalized discursive practices, carries over into judicial discourse.  I find that the 
judiciary demands transsexuality be spoken, but utilizes medical discourse to define and 
interpret transsexuality.  Examining Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, I argue that the tropes of 
the transsexual act as techniques of Cartesianism that require transsexual subjects 



























À CÔTÉ DE LUI: POSTMODERNISM, CARTESIAN SUBJECTIVITY 




A Subjective Explosion 
 In 1952 the media erupted with the news of an Ex-GI Turned Blonde Beauty.  
Christine Jorgensen, then just thirty, returned to the United States after her successful sex 
reassignment surgery and became an over-night sensation.  Jorgensen’s face covered the 
front page of newspapers and inspired thousands of others to follow in her footsteps.  
Classy and ultra-feminine, Jorgensen utilized her image to become a writer and a 
performer with a successful career.  Her autobiography was a best seller, and her story 
was the inspiration for countless other popular representations of transsexuals. 
 Jorgensen in many ways had a relatively normal childhood.  As Dr. Harry 
Benjamin indicates in the introduction to Jorgensen’s 1967 autobiography Christine 
Jorgensen, A Personal Autobiography, “There was no broken home, no weak or absent 
father with whom the little boy could not identify.  These are still the favorite theories of 
many psychologists and psychoanalysts to explain the transsexual state, but they do not 
fit into the childhood of Christine Jorgensen.”1   
 Despite her rather normal rearing, Jorgensen still experienced discomfort with her 
body and other people’s reaction to her body, demeanor, and interests during childhood.  
 
2 
Swimming with some local boys at a “swimming hole” in upstate New York, Jorgensen 
writes that the boys would often say, “ ‘C’mon, George,” they challenged. ‘Why don’t 
you swim in your birthday suit like we do?’”2  Although Jorgensen liked to swim, she 
could not get past wearing a complete bathing suit, both top and bottom, and lied saying 
that she would be too cold.  Once Jorgensen started school, she encountered just how 
scathing people could be.  At school, a teacher found some needlework in Christine’s 
desk.  When she (then known as George) returned from recess, she found that it was 
missing.  She didn’t notice that her mother was there in the classroom waiting for her 
return.   
  In the silence that followed, the teacher took an object from her desk.  “Is 
this yours?” she asked, with a prim little smile, holding the precious needlepoint 
just beyond my reach. 
  “Yes” I answered.  I felt the quick sting of tears, the blood rushing to my 
face and heard a hot little breath such in behind me in excitement.  I reached out 
to take the needlepoint from her hand, but she withdrew it sharply and faced my 
mother. 
  “Mrs. Jorgensen, do you think that this is anything for a red-blooded boy 
to have in his desk as a keepsake? The next thing we know, George will be 
bringing his knitting to school!” 
  There were titters from the class which she didn’t try to silence.  I glanced 
at Mom.  Her lips were quivering and her face flushed. “I’ll Take care of it,” she 
said quietly, and guided me ahead of her out of the classroom.3 
 
The shame that Jorgensen felt from her teacher continued through her adolescence.  After 
a brief stint in the Army (from 1945 to 1946), she returned home looking for a stable job 
and determined to hide her feelings.  Jorgensen was living in Hollywood at the time 
trying to make it as a photographer.  Visiting Helen and June (a couple of friends), 
Jorgensen finally expressed her feelings.  They suggested that she might be homosexual, 
though Jorgensen insisted that she felt like a girl.  Recalling his childhood Jorgensen told 
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them, “Gradually, of course, I had to accept the things that were forced on me.  ‘In other 
words,’ June interrupted, ‘you only did the things you had to do because they were 
expected.’”4  Here Jorgensen learned that Demark (where Helen had been traveling) 
viewed sexual problems as normal, not something shameful or criminal.  Although her 
desire to obtain medical help increased during this time, Jorgensen did not seek a doctor. 
 Jorgensen, of course, went on to become the twentieth century’s most well-known 
and successful transsexual.  I bring up Jorgensen here not to discuss her fame or her 
success as a performer and film editor.  Instead, I want to highlight the feelings that 
Jorgensen had, starting in childhood and continuing into young adulthood.  While it 
seems that Jorgensen has some misgivings about her body as a young child, the critiques 
and snide remarks of others exacerbated Jorgensen’s feelings of shame and guilt.  
Jorgensen felt as if she were a girl, though she had the body of a boy and was raised to 
act like a boy, and internalized much of the shame she felt around others. 
 It is this narrative of feeling different, and the turning inward of shame and guilt 
that leads me to discuss transsexual subjectivity, or rather the creation of a transsexual 
subjectivity in the 1950s.  Though Jorgensen was not the first transsexual, she was by all 
accounts the most popular with the media.  Her presence led to an explosion of writing 
about transsexualism in the United States, starting with Harry Benjamin and his 
associates.  The writings of medical and psychological professionals are littered with 
narratives similar to Jorgensen’s – full of anxiety and fear. 
 I believe that this anxiety and fear – though personal for Jorgensen – 
characterized the social mindset for much of the United States in the mid-twentieth 
century.  As Margot Canaday argues, the bureaucratic state, having just finished a war, 
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was trying to find ways to deal with the influx of male workers coming back to the states.  
The number of workers far outnumbered available jobs.  With the help of certain 
government programs and the GI-Bill, some were able to find work, while others – such 
as those with a “pink” discharge for being gay – were only possibly covered under the GI 
bill.  These anxieties about the labor force and masculinity, combined with an increased 
drive in consumerism aimed at women, concerned literary critics, writers and artists more 
generally.  In exploring the effects of war, the seeming instability of gender roles, and the 
move toward entertainment and consumerism, writers, critics, artists and philosophers 
started the postmodern movement as a critique of modern industrial capitalism.   
 It is within this context that I wish to couch the creation of the figure of the 
transsexual.  Against this backdrop, as we will see, several factors went in to the 
production and elaboration of the figure of the transsexual5 and its “proper” narrative.  In 
a way, we could read the figure of the transsexual as the postmodern figure because of its 
questioning of the foundations of what we believe to be a rational subjectivity.  Using the 
work of Michel Foucault and Lynne Huffer as guides, I examine transsexual subjectivity 
through the linking of discursive fields and the production of the figure of the transsexual 
and its various tropes.  In looking at discursive fields, I am interested in institutional 
discourse and how it creates subjectivity positions.  Personal experience also shapes and 
informs subjectivity, but for the purposes of this project, I am bracketing the personal in 
an effort to better examine the institutional side of subjectivity creation. 
 I argue that the transsexual – positioned as both abnormal and mad – is defined 
against a normative Cartesian, or “rational,” subjectivity.  Focusing on the Cartesian 
subject highlights a conception of subjectivity under explored in transsexual and queer 
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theory.  This analytical lens shows the workings of rationalism, a deeper way of not 
counting, and that transsexual subjectivity is, at its base, created in medicalized unreason.  
Through the linking of medical, psychological, and judicial discourse, we can see just 
how transsexual subjectivity is always already questionable and subjected to 
interpretation from the discursive fields.  While the linking of discourses can be 
productive for transsexual patients and trans activists (I am thinking here of Joanne 
Meyerowitz’s description of the “Liberal Moment”), the unintelligibility of transsexual 
subjectivity always requires interpretation through the medical and psychological fields. 
  
Postmodernism and the Critique of Reason 
 Is it possible that the alignment of postmodernism and the creation of the figure of 
the transsexual is mere coincidence?  In the sense of traditional history, yes.  It could be 
that the anxieties produced through World War II, the rise of science and the cold war led 
to the postmodern critiques of society, and the simple advancement of Science (with a 
capital “S”) “naturally” led to the discovery of the transsexual in the 1950s.  Yet looking 
at the birth of the transsexual in this manner leads to a few problems. 
 First it keeps history in a box – or rather divides history into parts, fracturing 
history into the history of “things.”  For example: the history of Science, the history of 
war, and the history of the United States.  These demarcations of history seem to be 
coherent and self-explanatory.  Yet when put to the test, we can see that these histories 
overlap and overstep their bounds.  If each of these seemingly coherent categories 
constitutes a discursive field, then the slippage between fields alludes to what Derrida 
believed to be the false center of discourse.6  We assume that there is a “center,” a 
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coherent sign around which discourse is organized.  Yet as Derrida shows, there is no 
center, only the substitution and play of centers.  While we can use such arbitrary 
markers or categories of history such as “the history of Science,” Derrida reminds us that 
these categories are both the cause and effect of discourse. 
 If the divisions of history are arbitrary (albeit sometimes useful), then saying that 
the creation of the figure of the transsexual and the critiques of postmodernism are 
separate is equivalent to saying that the history of Science and the history of war are 
separate.  The same anxieties that produced the postmodern movement contextualize the 
creation of the figure of the transsexual.  As Susan Stryker argues, the public’s 
fascination with Christine Jorgensen is no doubt part of the anxieties around masculinity 
and the general fascination with the advancement of science leading up to the 1950s.7 
 Thus postmodernism can be used as a context and a lens for reading the figure of 
the transsexual.  I use postmodernism to examine the figure of the transsexual and its 
creation during the 1950s.  I am not saying that subjects similar to transsexuals were not 
present prior to the 1950s.  In fact, just the opposite is true.  Various sexologists in the 
late 1800s wrote about “inverts” that felt they were trapped in the wrong body.  Rather 
the postmodern lens shows how various discourses change, link, diverge and play 
through repetition and substitution.  These linking and splittings of discourse provide a 
reading of the transsexual figure that is more than a history of transsexuality.  The 
postmodern lens highlights that discourse itself produces subjectivities, indeed multiplies 
and refines them in infinite play. 
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 Thinking of transsexual subjectivity in terms of postmodernism and discourse 
leads me to ask under what conditions does the figure of the transsexual appear? This 
question is undoubtedly complex and far beyond the scope of this paper, but a quick word 
just to indicate the complexity at hand.  In order for the transsexual to appear as it did in 
the U.S. in the 1950s, there had to be a concept of sex – and more importantly a binary 
system of sex that is male and female.  Further there had to be an understanding of the 
proper function of “sex” in both senses of the term, as in male/female and the meaning 
and physical act of sex.  But an understanding of “sex” is not enough.  We had to find a 
way to rationalize sex, to examine it and understand sex – how it worked, how we did it, 
why we did it, its purpose, its morality etc.  Thus medicine (and its particular branch, 
sexology) had to be conceptualized and developed.  Medicine and psychology had to 
refine the concept of the abnormal and the mad, an effort to define what is “normal” 
through the explicit examination of what is unnatural or unreason.  The list of conditions 
could go on. 
 The figure of the transsexual was created in the setting of American sexology in 
the mid-twentieth century.  In Disorders of Desire: Sexuality and Gender in Modern 
American Sexology,8 Janice Irvine argues that the fledging field of sexology walked a 
fine line between outside influence (second-wave feminism, homophile movement, gay 
liberation) and legitimation through medicalized standards.  Given the anxiety about 
gender roles, the family, and sexuality more generally, Irvine argues “sexology hoped to 
build and expand a market through addressing cultural fears about the survival of 
heterosexuality and the institution of marriage.”9  Thus sexology tried to legitimate its 
own position as a medical field through using medical language while also tapping into a 
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service market.  Sexology was comprised of not only medical doctors and psychologists, 
but also a variety of sex therapists and self-help writers who all tried to address – in one 
way or another – the anxiety surrounding gender roles and American’s “sex” problem.10 
 Out of fear, the medical sexologists instituted trade journals, conferences and 
institutionalized programs in an effort to standardize the field of sexology, yet the very 
ideologies/findings of sexology provided a way to undermine the developing field.11  
Irvine shows how the work of Alfred Kinsey, William Masters, and Virginia Johnson 
provided increased knowledge about changing sexual mores and practices in modern 
American culture.  While American sexologists were examining the laxity of sexual 
mores in an effort to “fix the conjugal bed,” publications like Newsweek, Time, and 
couples or sex manuals were promoting sex in articles and in advertisements. 
 Within the mixed messages about sex and sexuality, the figure of the transsexual 
appeared as a gender variant medical/psychological personage.  Irvine argues that sex 
reassignment surgery, though not performed widely, was part of the “mid-twentieth 
century transformations in social and economical arrangements [that] created optimal 
conditions for sexology to take root, expand, and ultimately market interventions.”12 
 While Irvine focuses on the contentions within and external to sexology, other 
historians focus on the mid-twentieth century need to pin down or stabilize sex.  In trying 
to parse out a “history” of transsexuality, academics and activists alike have chosen “sex” 
to be their primary analytical category.  In How Sex Changed: a History of 
Transsexuality in the United States, Joanne Meyerowitz examines how notions of “sex” 
were challenged, redefined and changed through transsexual patients, doctors and 
 
9 
transsexual activism.  She argues that transsexual patients were not “dupes of gender,” 
but rather, “that they were ordinary and extraordinary human beings who searched for 
workable solutions to pressing personal problems” and that “their struggles show us how 
sex changed in the twentieth century.”13  To show how sex changed in the mid-twentieth 
century, Meyerowitz examines medical professionals, their patients, and the ways in 
which transsexuals instituted certain practices as modes of resistance using “the language 
and cultural forms available to them.”14 
 In the chapter “A Fierce and Demanding Drive,” Meyerowitz contextualizes the 
transsexual desire to change sex in the 1960s in an era of “[the] pursuit of self-fulfillment 
[and]… ‘self-actualization.’”15  Yet in their pursuit to change their bodies, transsexuals 
“bumped up against the power of medical gatekeepers, the costs of commodified medical 
care, and the limits of technology.”16  In their persistence, some transsexual patients were 
able to find doctors to help them.  This “fierce and demanding drive” led some doctors to 
believe that transsexuals were psychopaths, which created a doctor-patient relation 
fraught with problems.17   
 Transsexual patients also took to the courts to lobby the judiciary for rights.  In 
the chapter “The Liberal Moment,” Meyerowitz examines how transsexual patients were 
able to use the liberal ‘60s and ‘70s, “taking on the task of defining the legal meanings of 
sex and gender, of who counted legally as a woman and who counted legally as a man.  
The public process of redefining sex, seen earlier in the press and the medical literature, 
had found its way into the law.”18 
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 Susan Stryker presents a much more political transsexual/transgender history in 
Transgender History.19  Stryker highlights the transgender activism in the late ‘50s and 
early ‘60s by examining events like the Compton’s Cafeteria Riot of 1966 in San 
Francisco, in which a melee broke out over an officer harassing one of a group of street 
queens.20  This kind of harassment prefigured what Stryker calls the “Difficult Decades” 
of the late 1960’s and ‘70s.  As more universities picked up gender identity clinics – like 
those at UCLA, Stanford and the University of Texas – transsexual patients quickly 
realized that “the new university-based scientific research programs were far more 
concerned with restabilizing the gender system, which seems to be mutating all around 
them in bizarre and threatening directions, than they were in helping that cultural 
revolution along by further exploding mandatory relationships between the sexed 
embodiment, psychological gender identity, and social gender role.”21  Rather than 
questioning the relationship between sex and gender, medical professionals strove to 
maintain static notions of sex and gender – choosing to provide proliferation of sex and 
gender categories through abnormality. 
 In “I Went to Bed with My Own Kind Once: The Erasure of Desire in the Name 
of Identity,”22 David Valentine looks at the cost of taking on an identity produced 
through a neat system that accounts for both gender identification and erotic desire.  
Valentine shows that our need to pin-down sex, or codify sex and gender expression 
through binary categories, marginalizes those whose identity markers do not fit neatly 
into the system.  He says, “things are not always so clear cut, for frequently, as I will 
show, erotic desires expressed in speech can conflate, confuse, and contradict this 
neatness.”23  Focusing on speech, or the way in which categories are used in speech, 
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Valentine shows how some subjects use categories of sex, gender, and sexuality 
interchangeably to express themselves, often employing contradictory categories and 
thereby defying strict binary categorization.  Studying the speech of various members of 
an alternative lifestyles group in New York, Valentine records the various ways in which 
one subject – Angel – reports her identification(s) and the discomfort her conflicting 
identity produces for other members of her alternative lifestyles group.  This discomfort, 
Valentine argues, points out the limits of identity and the way in which desire and self-
expression are erased while also highlighting our need to pin-down and categorize sex, 
gender, and sexuality.24 
 What Meyerowitz, Stryker and Valentine have in common is their use of “sex” as 
an analytical framework.  By using “sex” to analyze transgender history and identity, 
each author in his or her own way points to the ways in which the dichotomous system of 
sex, gender and sexuality were examined, challenged, and redefined or restabilized 
through the figure of the transsexual.  While using “sex” as an analytical category is 
helpful in showing our need or desire to pin-down/redefine sex and that desire’s effects 
on subjectivity, I suggest that there is a need to look at transsexuality through lenses other 
than just “sex.”  Because the figure of the transsexual questions so many boundaries 
regarding sex, gender, sexuality, abnormality, madness, subjectivity, and the stabilization 
of categories/systems, examining transsexuality and transgenderism only through the lens 
of “sex” produces a limited reading of transsexual history and subjectivity. 
  Rather than examine the figure of the transsexual through the category of “sex,” I 
suggest that the concept of Reason shapes and frames sex and sexuality in a way that, 
when examined, provides a nuanced understanding of transsexual subjectivity.  Reason, 
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or the desire for reason, undergirds sex and sexuality.  In Sexuality One, Foucault argues 
that “’Sexuality’: [is] the correlative of that slowly developed discursive practice which 
constitutes the scientia sexualis.  The essential features of this sexuality are not the 
expression of a representation that is more or less distorted by ideology, or of a 
misunderstanding caused by taboos; they correspond to the functional requirements of a 
discourse that must produce its truth.”25  The need or desire to make meaning out of sex, 
our very need to parse sex into acceptable/unacceptable practices, alludes to a desire to 
rationalize sex, to find the “truth” in the discourse of sex.  Thus the notion of reason 
shapes and informs discourse.  It is at once the constituting concept of discourse (I am 
thinking here of the very order of language and its division into the sign, signifier and 
signified) and its effect. 
 Given this constitution-effect position of reason, examining the division of 
reason/unreason and its influence in the categoritization of sex, sexuality, and identity 
will helps us better understand our desire to pin down sex and divide sexual practices and 
identities along the lines of reason and unreason.  Since the Enlightenment – and 
particularly in the eighteenth century – there has been a shift in how we view sex and 
sexuality that causes a further division of sexual practices and the production of sexual 
identities.  I am not making the argument that necessarily new identities have been 
created, but rather a recentering of discursive fields that fractures “normal” or “natural” 





The Madness is Catching 
 It is reason, or rather the postmodern critique of reason that I offer as an analytical 
frame.  “Rational subjectivity” is coherent, divided between the interior – the thinking 
self – and the exterior body/world.  Descartes identifies this subjectivity as a thinking 
being that is present and can know its world and self because it has reason and 
perception.  Reason is the ability to know that which is right and that which is wrong or 
evil and thus determine a right way of being/living.  The Cartesian subject, the subject 
that we’ve been given since the Enlightenment according to postmodernism, holds that 
we as beings have reason, and utilizing that reason (or the internal thinking part of the 
self) will help us better humanity. 
 It is this Cartesian subject that I will use as a guide for the examination of the 
transsexual.  In Mad for Foucault: Rethinking the Foundations of Queer Theory,26 Lynne 
Huffer uses Foucault’s History of Madness as a guiding text for rethinking queer ethics 
and practices.  She argues in “How we Became Queer” that unreasonable erotic 
expressions were grouped under the general category of madness and split from reason.  
Positioned as such, Huffer argues that Madness “is about the internalization of bourgeois 
morality which produces, eventually, the ‘fable’ of an inner psyche, soul, or 
conscience.”27  Because such interiority is produced through shame and guilt from 
external formations of morality, it is what Huffer and Deleuze calls the “fold” of the 
outside.  
 This splitting of the subject and the splitting of unreason from reason is what 
Foucault calls the “Cartesian Moment” in Hermeneutics of the Subject.28  Huffer 
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contends that this double splitting calls being into question.  If the split of reason and 
unreason served to render certain bodies and practices mad while holding others up as 
normal, then what should be our approach to queer ethics?  Or put another way, in what 
ways should we be listening and reconceptualizing the mad?  It is this question that 
Huffer tries to answer through her examination of Madness and her critique of queer 
theory. 
 Huffer critiques both Judith Butler and Lee Edelman for maintaining the status of 
the inner psyche, or rather not questioning the ways in which the fable of an interior self 
creates subjects that are derogatorily queer.  While performativity theory questions the 
relationship between sex and gender through discursive practices, it crystallizes the 
psyche through the inversion of sex and gender, rather than questioning the division of an 
interior/exterior that performs and comes to be the sign of sex.  Similarly, Huffer 
critiques Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive29 in which 
Edelman argues that queers should embrace the role given to them, this subjectivity with 
no future or a subject unto death.  Huffer believes that embracing such a position, while 
trying to pull “queer” into a positive and empowering term, does not question how the 
subject-unto-death subjectivity affects queers.  Like Butler, Edelman’s work leaves the 
interior/exterior division of the subject unquestioned, simply substituting a new 
interiority for the old.  
 This questioning of queer ethics leads Huffer to examine what she calls the 
“desubjectification” of the subject, or the voiding of the subject.  Huffer notes that 
Foucault – in a Deleuzian way – draws attention to the coextensivity of the subject, or put 
a different way, the inseparableness of the inside and outside, or the mind and the body.  
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Foucault “rethinks the subject in her coextension not only with her social, historical, and 
discursive environment but also, ultimately, with the act of thinking itself.”30  The 
Cartesian subject resists thinking towards its own limit, or where the inside and outside 
meet, or mind and body meet.  Thinking outside of thinking, outside the Cartesian 
subject, becomes the specter of madness or the undoing of the subject as we know it.  Put 
another way, the rethinking of the mind/body divide pushes subjectivity to the limit and 
undermines conceptions of what it means to be a rational, thinking subject with a 
presence in the world through the body. 
 Similarly, Huffer shows that Foucault also believed sexuality to be a limit, a “void 
arrested at the limit … through the violent, ‘denaturalizing’ languages of logic and nature 
wielded by science.”31  In this way, madness has slowly come to be “madness-as-
sexuality.”32  This positioning of madness-as-sexuality, the limit of thinking and 
language, raises ethical questions for Huffer.  How do we move or think beyond the 
limits of language?  Ironically, we have to use the language of reason to talk about 
madness.  The utilization of rational language produces the subjects of madness as 
unintelligible: those thinking the limit are “a ‘sideways’ encounter with a language that 
speaks but that philosophy does not know… ‘the philosopher…discovers that there is, 
beside him [à côté de lui], a language that speaks and of which he is not the master.’”33  
Thus this madness becomes “deprived, ‘at every moment not only of what it has just said, 
but of the very ability to speak.’”34 
 The denial of the ability to speak is, I believe, how the figure of the transsexual is 
positioned in madness.  Because transsexualism, the desire to alter one’s body to match 
the “interior” sex, is expressing a desire that is beyond the limit of a Cartesian rational 
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subjectivity, it requires the creation of a rational language (or the play of discourse) to 
speak of its irrationality.  Or put another way, transsexuality requires interpretation for 
reason to comprehend it and arrest its movement toward the limit of being.  This is the 
function of the medical and psychological communities – to act as containment fields of 
discourse that express the irrational in a rational way, again splitting and separating 
reason from unreason. 
 In addition, or perhaps counter to, the figure of madness, Andrew N. Sharpe in 
Foucault’s Monsters and the Challenge of Law,35 argues that the transsexual is a modern 
representation of what Foucault calls the “abnormal” or monster.  Sharpe uses Foucault’s 
lectures in Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France 1974-197536 to frame his 
discussion of the transsexual (among other modern representations of ‘monsters’).  
Transsexuals, according to Sharpe, are considered to be “monsters” because of their 
“double breach, of law and nature.”37  According to Sharpe, it wasn’t until the medical 
community advanced its surgical techniques that transsexual patients with successful sex 
reassignment surgeries began to petition the legal definition of sex.  He traces the 
response of the judiciary, especially in the United Kingdom in Corbett v. Corbett, 
through two different legal methods.  The first is the “sex is determined at birth” method 
presented in Corbett, the second in reform jurisprudence which seeks to allow litigants to 
make claims about their sex based on a certain medical state. 
 The “sex determined at birth” method, Sharpe argues, rests in a judicial anxiety to 
keep rigid lines of sex difference for the purposes of procreation and marriage.  Yet under 
examination, Sharpe finds that Ormrod J’s decision is not as stable as he may wish.  
Ormrod J acknowledges that he was lucky to be faced with a transsexual, for “the 
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difficulty would be acute in the cases of testicular feminization and testicular failure.”38  
Such a strict definition of sex created through anxiety about the blurring of sex difference 
and the possibility of same-sex marriage does not work well, and in fact highlights other 
possible aberrations of bodies under the law.  
 The second method that Sharpe presents, reform jurisprudence, is perhaps just as 
dubious as the “sex determined at birth method.”  While reform jurisprudence has 
allowed post-operative transsexuals to make a claim about their sex, it does not allow 
those that are pre-operative or who do not wish to undergo the knife to make a claim 
about their sex.  Thus, “while reform jurisprudence has, at least ostensibly, brought the 
post-operative transsexual within the law, it would seem that the exclusion of pre-or non-
operative transsexuals is informed by their decision not to undergo genital surgery.”39  
This places the burden of the monster on the transsexual subject in that transsexuals are 
expected to submit to normalization.  Those “who [refuse] to be normalized, and who 
thereby [continue] to pose a challenge to legal order, [are] scripted as culpable.”40  Yet 
not even post-operative transsexuals are free from the figure of the monster in English 
law.  Rather post-operative transsexuals, even when encountering the law, come up 
against barriers that place them back in the figure of the monster.  Sharpe notes that, as 
decided in Corbett, the law requires the disclosure of “gender history”: “the fact [is] that 
non-disclosure, what the courts prefer to describe as inter-personal ‘fraud’, has assumed 
special significance in relation to legal consideration of sex claims.”41 
 Even in the liberal framing of reform jurisprudence, Sharpe believes that the law 
still returns to the body.  A section of his conclusion is worth citing at length for its 
allusion to Cartesian subjectivity and the legal/medical focus on the body. 
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 Both the mind and the body can constitute a monstrosity in law.  Interestingly 
 however, the body proves resilient to reform.  For, in thinking about the Gender 
 Recognition Act, it is necessary to invoke a distinction between substance and 
 legal reform.  As already noted, it is clearly the expectation of the UK government 
 that surgery will occur.  Moreover, the absence of surgery must be explained by 
 medical report and it may serve to cast doubt on a diagnosis of gender dysphoria 
 and therefore block the avenue to legal recognition.  The body, and therefore the 
 relevance of the older meaning of the concept of monstrosity as morphological 
 irregularity, also reasserts itself though a legal requirement under the Act to 
 disclose gender history.  Here law returns to the body and, more particularly, to 
 biological “truth” as the ultimate arbiter of what it means to be male or female 
 and therefore human.42  
 
Here Sharpe lists both the mind and the body that can constitute the monster in law.  
Under the Gender Recognition Act in the United Kingdom, transsexuals are allowed to 
change their legal status of gender post-surgery.  For all intents and purposes – especially 
that of marriage – once the operation is completed and the legal paperwork filed, that 
person is considered to be their desired gender.  Yet the law creates an imbalance because 
it requires 1) that the transsexual patient have surgery in order to claim the legal status of 
their gender and 2) requires that each post-operative transsexual reveal their ‘gender 
history,’ again, especially where marriage is concerned.  Thus the figure of the 
transsexual, even in liberal circles, is still figured in the monstrous or the abnormal, now 
more than ever through bodily means.  Should a transsexual not wish to have sex 
reassignment surgery, he or she is not considered to be normal, but rather abnormal or 
monstrous. 
 Here, with both Huffer and Sharpe in mind, I am interested in the simultaneous 
linking and splitting of discursive fields.  In Abnormal, Foucault discusses the ways in 
which discourses are considered to be true, or the ways in which certain discourses gain 
validity.  He shows quite convincingly that, when faced with a “monstrous” figure, the 
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Law seeks out other discourses to utilize so that it can successfully pass judgment.  
Specifically he shows how psychology is called in to testify when the Law is faced with a 
figure that it cannot understand, or for which it cannot pass judgment.  The criminal with 
no motive, or the criminal with no psychosis or delusional state, became a problem for 
the judiciary in the mid-nineteenth century.  The monster of the seventeenth century (a 
figure who was half-man, half-animal, or a mixture of both sexes, or otherwise some 
freak of nature) to interesting twists and turns through discourse, becoming by the 
eighteenth century the “individual to be corrected,”43 and later the child masturbator or 
the “abnormal individual” in the nineteenth century.44 
 Through the linking of discourses – the psychological to the juridical – Foucault 
shows that the “monster” or the “criminal with no motive” was slowly turned into a case 
history, a past, and a tendency that represented the crime in the criminal before he could 
commit the crime.  This “laughable” form of discourse, utilized by psychologists, traces 
the criminality of the criminal back to childhood, a move that “introduces different 
techniques that for a sort of third, insidious, and hidden term, carefully cloaked on all 
sides and at every point by the legal notions of ‘delinquency,’ ‘recidivism,’ et cetera, and 
the medical concepts of ‘illness’ et cetera.”45  
 This production of the “abnormal individual” through the normalizing yet 
laughable (in that the production is rendered in puerile language) effects of power allows 
various State apparatuses to develop a “refined … general technique of the exercise of 
power that can be transferred to many different institutions and apparatuses.”46  This 
general technique of power that is transferrable allows us to think differently about the 
“abnormal individual” and the figure of the transsexual.  As we will see, medical and 
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psychological professionals later took up the narrative initially used by transsexual 
patients.  This utilization of “the” transsexual narrative traced the vestiges of 
transsexualism (as with Jorgensen) to childhood.  As the figure of the transsexual came 
before the judiciary in the mid-twentieth century, medical and psychological 
professionals – already exercising power over a medicalized condition – testified before 
the judiciary, effectively transferring the figure of the transsexual and its narrative to 
another State apparatus. 
 These techniques allow for the transferral of power from one apparatus to another 
is what Foucault more explicitly examines in his essay “Omnes et Singulatam.”47  In this 
essay Foucault argues that the State and the way in which power is exercised through 
various state apparatuses (both linking and splitting to reinforce and create new 
discursive fields) becomes a totalizing and individualizing apparatus.  Totalizing in that 
life, or bios, becomes part of the polis, or the function of the state.48  Individualizing in 
that the powers exercised through various apparatuses effects and controls individuals, or 
put another way, comes to exercise power on individuals acutely.  
 It is the linking and splitting (or refining) of discursive fields that produce the 
individualizing and totalizing effect.  The figure of the transsexual in the U.S. context 
was first encountered in the medical profession.  Because of the status of the medical and 
psychological fields as scientific, their assessment of transsexualism was taken as a 
general truth.  Later, when transsexuals sought rights through the judiciary, the medical 
and psychological communities were called in to testify as “knowers” of the transsexual 
state.  As such the figure of the transsexual was transferred from one discursive field 
(medico-psychological) to the judiciary.  This transfer has the effect of being both 
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totalizing and individualizing.  As transsexual patients took to the judiciary, they stood 
before the law as individuals.  The decisions of the courts had individual effects on 
litigants while also having a totalizing effect in that the state became increasingly 
concerned with “sex” and the regulation/definition of sex. 
 “Sex” was (and still is) one of the basic ways in which the State parses and 
categorizes its citizens.  As James C. Scott argues in Seeing Like a State,49 the act of 
nation building consists of creating and integrating readily usable systems that quickly 
and easily demarcate citizens of the state.  Everything from city-state infrastructure 
(major-thoroughfares, recourses, etc.) to the obligatory creation of surnames creates a 
way in which the State can easily identify a citizen in an individual sense.  These systems 
or structures indicate what Foucault50 and Scott both believe to be the purpose of the 
state: management of life.  Not that the State cares about individual lives per se, but 
rather that the State takes care of a population, and entity or mass of people that can be 
divided, categorized and easily understood. 
 Given the State’s aims at readily identifiable citizens, we can now look at 
madness and abnormality through a different lens.  I argue that the figure of the 
transsexual could fall under both the heading of madness and of abnormality.  I am not 
saying that transsexuality should be under these headings – indeed my purpose is to 
rethink how the figure of the transsexual came to be framed in both madness and 
abnormality.  Because the figure of the transsexual, as Sharpe argues, is a double breach 
of both natural and civil law, the transsexual is subject to both the category of the 
monster or the abnormal, while also falling under the heading of madness because of its 
unintelligible rendering of internal desire and external appearance.   
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 These two factors – or the combination of madness and abnormality – place the 
transsexual in a subject position that is unintelligible or in the best circumstances 
questionable and subject to surveillance and State interrogation that seeks to return the 
mad/abnormal personage to society through correction, or to contain the mad/abnormal 
through institutionalization or heightened surveillance.  These two methods are what I 
call technologies of Cartesianism.  The first seeks to correct the mad/abnormal through 
intervention (medical, psychological, etc.) as a way to bring the individual back to the 
normative fold.  Generally speaking, sex reassignment surgery was created to fix the 
social problem of individuals who did not fit the sex/gender expectations of society.  Sex 
reassignment surgery, while desired by patients, was also a way to “correct” the issue and 
return the individual to society as a new and “normal” man or woman.  The second 
method is related to the first and later picked up in the judiciary.  While there were 
transsexuals who were committed to asylums because of their condition, few were 
contained in such a manner.  Yet the regulatory function of medicine and the law serve as 
a containment apparatus that ensures that individuals will uphold the standard of their 
target gender while being subjected to constant reminders of their “deviant” status 
through various (and often confusing) regulations and policies. 
 If, as Huffer and other postmodernists argue, we have lived under a Cartesian 
understanding of subjectivity since the Enlightenment period and its revaluation of 
reason, then why should we examine transsexuality and transgenderism?  Why not 
examine homosexuality, bisexuality, or even heterosexuality?  What makes the figure of 
the transsexual a better candidate for examination through a critique of Cartesianism?  It 
is true that just about any identity could be examined through Cartesianism, yet the figure 
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of the transsexual and its history best displays the effects of such a conception of 
subjectivity.  At the risk of making a rather broad generalization, it is possible to argue 
that most heterosexuals, homosexuals and bisexuals are comfortable with their gender 
expression and the “sex” of their physical bodies.  Further, while homosexuals and 
bisexuals could possibly present a narrative that locates their sexuality in an abnormal 
feeling in childhood, such a narrative focuses on the emotional aspect of having a desire 
that is counter to social norms.  Conversely, the transsexual narrative, while also couched 
in childhood abnormality, focuses on the dualism of the mind and body, a desire for a 
forbidden type of expression that is both emotional and physical (of one’s own body).  
Thus while other figures could possible benefit from a reading through the lens of 
Cartesian subjectivity, I believe the figure of the transsexual to be the most productive 
figure in that the examination of the figure will helps us reevaluate how identities are 
produced and commodified through transfer, repetition and play across discursive fields.  
 In the first chapter I argue that medical and psychological professionals used a 
Cartesian subject to interpret their patients’ narratives.  Patients expressed feeling as if 
they were in the wrong body.  In seeking help from the medical and psychological 
communities, transsexual patients asked medical professionals to correct their 
discordance of mind and body.  Initially, the medical and psychological communities 
fought over which practice could best treat transsexual patients.  The medical community 
believed that psychology and psychiatry did little to help transsexual patients.  The 
psychological community believed that medical professionals were allowing transsexual 
patients to change their bodies based on a psychological disorder that required psychiatric 
treatment, not surgery.   
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 Despite the warring medical and psychological communities, both doctors and 
psychiatrists used a Cartesian model of subjectivity, a rational split of the mind and body.  
Medicine focused on the body, and psychology focused on the mind.  Eventually these 
two discursive fields joined.  This joining of the fields – or rather the incorporation of 
psychology into the medical treatment of transsexual patients – further reified the 
Cartesian model.  Both fields, working together yet focusing on different parts of the 
subject, furthered the notion of an exterior body and a rational mind with rational (bodily) 
desires.   
 Further, the discursive practices of both fields produced stereotypical tropes of 
transsexual subjectivity.  Many medical and psychological professionals positioned their 
patients as desperate, conniving, unreliable and suffering from a psychopathic disorder.  
These generalizations frame the transsexual subject in terms of madness – a subject that 
is always already questionable and unintelligible.  These oversimplified stereotypes 
became a utilizable subject position for the linking of other discourses.  Other state 
discursive fields, such as the military, the judiciary and the legislature, all adopted the 
tropes, creating a generalizing belief about the figure of the transsexual that readily 
legible and easy to manipulate. 
 To examine the issues presented in chapter one, I look at the works of medical 
and psychological professionals in professional journals and books ranging from the late 
1800s to about 1980.51  I also examine patient letters to Harry Benjamin and Charles 
Ihernfeld and their assistant Virginia Allen.  These documents show the war between the 
medical and psychological field through their journal articles and books, while showing 
the transsexual patient’s narrative of feeling trapped in the wrong body and their drive for 
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relief.  In addition, these works show the joining of the medical community in the 1960s 
and ‘70s while also showing the creation of the stereotypical transsexual tropes that will 
later be picked up and examined through other institutions.  
 Looking at the linking of medico-psychological and judicial discourse 
demonstrates how the various stereotypes of the transsexual are refigured and played out 
in other institutions.  In chapter two I examine how the various tropes of the transsexual 
are picked up, refashioned and played out before the court.  The linking of discourse and 
the production of the transsexual tropes function as technologies of Cartesianism in the 
courtroom.  These stereotypes are utilitarian in function, serving to police the borders of 
“proper” transsexual subjectivity.  Looking at the linking of medico-psychological and 
judicial discourse shows how the stereotypes of the transsexual are refigured and played 
out in other institutions.  This movement of the figure of the transsexual into the 
courtroom, while potentially restrictive, also provides sites of resistance for transsexual 
patients.  Some transsexuals were able to navigate the judicial system and gain rights 
based on their transsexual identity.  While productive for right-seeking subjects, the 
position of the transsexual in unreason under the Cartesian subjectivity system requires 
medical and psychological translators for the court.  Faced with an unintelligible 
subjectivity, the courts call in medical and psychological professionals to interpret 
transsexual subjectivity. 
 To better understand the history of sexual deviancy, the body, and the law, I look 
at Herculine Barbin’s memoir.  This primary source material shows that bodily deviancy 
and sex were presented before the law in the mid-1800s.  Barbin’s memoir, when read 
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through the lens of Cartesianism, shows that the legal and medical professions then 
believed in a split mind and body. 
 Next I examine the law as an afterthought for twentieth-century medical 
professionals.  While the transsexual was part of a media sensation in the early 1950s, the 
transsexual stayed curiously out of the courtroom until the 1970s.  Looking at doctors’ 
writings in medical journals and books, I show how medical professionals discussed the 
legal implications of sex reassignment surgery.  Further I examine letters to discuss how 
the 1970s were not always the “liberal moment” that Meyerowitz argues it was.  While I 
believe that many court cases were part of a liberal movement to find in favor of 
transsexual patients, not all of the effects of the figure of the transsexual coming before 
the law were positive. 
 Next I examine Wallace v. Chicago and Ulane v. Eastern Airlines.  These two 
cases show how the transsexual was framed as a danger to the public and as a potential 
liability to employers.  These two cases show how the tropes of the transsexual, produced 
in the medical community, were utilized in the court system.  Although Wallace doesn’t 
call for the medical profession in the courtroom explicitly, transsexuality was positioned 
as a medical condition in two ways.  First, the two transsexuals under treatment were 
allowed to dress as women in public as part of their treatment.  Secondly, the dissent in 
the case shows one of the judges expressly calling for witnesses from the medical and 
psychological communities.  Lastly, because the two transsexuals were arrested for 
dressing in public as the opposite gender, the court had to answer whether transsexuals 
were a danger to the public because of their ability to dress differently and hide their 
identity.  Framed as a danger to the public, the transsexuals in the Wallace case shows 
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how the trope of the dangerous and transgressive transsexual can be utilized in law and in 
the courtroom. 
 Lastly, I examine Ulane v. Eastern Airlines.  This document displays several 
tropes of the transsexual in the courtroom.  Fired from her job after transitioning, Karen 
Ulane sued Eastern Airlines for wrongful termination under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act.  Judge Grady was asked if Title VII applied to transsexuals, if Ulane was truly a 
transsexual, and if Eastern Airlines fired Ulane for her transsexuality.  I show that 
Eastern’s defense team painted Ulane as a danger to the public, not a true transsexual, 
desperate, conniving, and willing to do anything to have her surgery.  Judge Grady finds 
in favor of Ulane after systematically examining each of Eastern’s claims for firing 
Ulane.  While this case was a positive decision for Ulane, ultimately medical and 
psychological professionals were called in to interpret Ulane and her character and 
subjectivity.  Doctors had to explain her condition and her mental and physical state.  Her 
own identity claim as a transsexual made it impossible for her – in this case – to defend 
herself.  The legality of her being was not so much on trial here, but rather her being 
itself.  I argue that the transsexual tropes produced the medical and psychological 
communities are utilitarian in nature.  The judicial and legal fields pick them up, 
refashion them and use them to construct arguments against transsexual patients. 
A Caveat 
 In the introduction to Mad For Foucault, Huffer acknowledges her own ironic 
position vis-à-vis her project.  Looking at the ethical treatment of subjects that is outside 
the splitting of the subject, Huffer notes her own use of reason and logic in order to make 
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a claim about reason and madness.  Moreover, as a queer person, Huffer also knows that, 
were she living in a different time, she too would be subject to confinement and labeled 
mad. 
 I, too, acknowledge my own positioning vis-à-vis this project.  I am also using the 
language of reason to write about madness/abnormality and the figure of the transsexual.  
Some might object to this work because I am not a trans-identified person.  I do not have 
the experiential knowledge that comes from feeling a dissonance with one’s body, nor do 
I have the experience of transitioning and living differently in this world under the 
scrutinizing and demanding gaze of society.  Yet in doing this work, I have tried to listen 
to those beside me, to those that may have been positioned as mad many years ago while 
also listening to those that tried to help them.  Moreover I have tried to let those people 
speak where the historical record leaves trances of their voice, and I have tried to render 
their narratives with care. 
 My hope is to better understand the formations of sex/gendered identities and 
their function within discursive fields.  Because of the historical and contemporary 
position of trans-identified persons vis-à-vis the medico-psychological community and 
the State, the transsexual is perhaps the figure that best shows the splitting, utilitarian, 
and sometimes liberatory functions of identity.  With a better understanding of how 
identities are conceived under the Cartesian subject, I believe that we can problematize 
identity politics and the efficacy of identity based rights.  The splitting of subjectivities, 
especially where the State is concerned, is never just a personal matter.  As we will see, 
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AN UNRELIABLE NARRATOR: THE LINKING OF MEDICAL AND 





Although Foucault does not address the figure of the transsexual in History of 
Madness, he discusses how those declared mad were viewed as unintelligible subjects 
and a danger to the general populace.1  In extending his argument, I suggest that the 
figure of the transsexual, as demonstrated through medical and psychological rhetoric, 
fits within Foucault’s concept of madness.  As we will see, transsexual patients were 
frequently positioned as the victims of a delusion or a psychopathological disease that 
caused them to feel as if they were in the wrong body.  This dissonance of the mind and 
body, coupled with the treatment of medical and psychological professionals, led to the 
conceptualization of transsexual patients as having a mental and/or physical disorder.  
But more importantly the splitting of the mind/body and the rational/irrational positions 
the figure of the transsexual in a subjected position under the Cartesian system of 
subjectivity.  
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, medicine as a field was in it infancy 
and approached the body holistically.  Charles Rosenberg argues in “The Therapeutic 
Revolution”2 that in the middle of the century, medicine shifted to a more “rational” 
approach to the body. Medicine initially treated the body and the mind together, believing 
that the body constituted a delicate balance or “system of dynamic interactions with its 
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environment.”3  A patient could not live without interacting with her environment 
(breathing, water intake, eating).  In addition to the interaction of the body with the 
environment, all parts of the body were assumed to be connected, including the mind and 
body.  Rosenberg writes, “A distracted mind could curdle the stomach; a dyspeptic 
stomach could agitate the mind.”4  
Yet by the mid- to late-1800s, medicine became a professional and scientific field, 
“shift[ing] from the home to some institutional setting” that relied less on the connection 
of the body to the mind and the environment, and more on empirical evidence of 
disease/illness treatment.5  Seeking to improve health, doctors, nurses, midwives and 
medical laypersons began a push to professionalize the field through institutionalization.  
Medicine at this time used a scientific method that privileged reason, systematic 
exploration, and that identified and classified bodies and illnesses.6  The rise in medical 
schools and educational boards helped standardize medical knowledge through 
hierarchical systems that classified bodies and illnesses within a rational paradigm while 
providing institutional backing to a specific field of knowledge.  With the birth of 
Darwinism in the mid-1800s and its taxonomic approach to classification, medical 
professionals and medical laypersons more generally began to parse and classify illnesses 
into discrete categories that have specific signs and symptoms.  Over time, the meanings 
of illnesses – their signs, symptoms and causes – shifted and proliferated as medical 
professionals added new information to the emerging paradigm. 
With the rise of the Victorian Era, there was an increased curiosity in the medical 
field in sex and sexuality.  As Foucault points out in Sexuality One,7 there was an intense 
need to speak about sexuality – one that we are still living in today.  Medical 
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professionals wrote about sexuality, classified the bodies involved, and sought to parse 
sexual illnesses, or rather illnesses latent with sexuality.  Taking up the role of the 
confessor, medical professionals began asking patients to reveal not only their bodies but 
also their sexual thoughts and practices.  This borrowing of the confessional, as Foucault 
argues, produces the sexual subject in that sex and sexuality are assumed to at once mask 
and provide a “truth” to the self.  The “truth” of sex, the guilt of sexual deviancy 
exacerbated through confession, and the assumption of an interior “true” sexual self with 
external implications, provided the path for the creation of various sexually deviant 
figures in the late 1800s.  This incitement to discourse not only provided the figure of the 
homosexual, but also the figure of the invert and the transvestite.  It is these two figures 
that will later lead to the development of the transsexual in the mid-1900s and will 
continue to inform conceptions of the transsexual patient. 
 Further it is this interior “truth” of sex that will shape and inform the discourse of 
transsexuality and sexual deviancy more generally.  Early patients revealed to doctors 
that they felt as if they were trapped in the wrong body.  This dissonance of the mind and 
body creates a narrative that fits within the corrective mission of rational medicine of the 
mid- and late-1800s.  By rational I mean the objective and methodical medicine that 
assumes that, in order for the body to function properly, its various parts must be properly 
dispositioned.  Thus the mind and the body, the body and its various parts and the body’s 
outward expression should align properly for correct function.8  This disposition of the 
mind and body, the division of the interior and exterior, shapes and informs the figure of 
the transsexual.  Moving into the twentieth century, the medical community shifted its 
focus to the body.9  The medical community, hearing a dissonance between mind and 
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body, sought to alleviate the dissonance through bodily treatment – hormone therapy and 
sex reassignment surgery.10 
 The majority of contemporary research on transsexual and transgender theory 
seeks to question our need to pin down sex, or rather a need to visually see someone as 
either male or female.  As Kath Weston argues,11 those individuals who do not visually 
fit into either sex category are momentarily unsexed, and could potentially experience 
violence because of others’ inability to visually sex them.  David Valentine,12 working 
with a transgender group in New York, notes that one particular member of the group 
defies identification through using multiple and sometimes-contradictory identity 
categories.  He argues that such a personage creates an anxiety for others because of her 
refusal to clearly identify as either once sex or the other.  Similarly, Meyerowitz13 
examines in How Sex Changed the development of sex and gender vis-à-vis the 
transsexual in the 1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s.  She argues that the meaning of sex – and the 
stability of sex – changed dynamically during this period. 
 Although looking at dynamic development and our compulsion to pin down a 
“true” sex is important for activists and scholars alike, I believe that looking at 
subjectivity provides a more fundamental examination of sex vis-à-vis subjectivity.  As 
Lynne Huffer suggests in her discussion of Foucault’s History of Madness, “The focus on 
Descartes – the philosopher par excellence of the subject, the ‘I’ of the cogito – highlights 
the centrality of subjectivity as a category of analysis for a history of madness.”14  
Questioning the foundations of queer theory, Huffer situates Foucault’s History of 
Madness as a way of rethinking how queer theory addresses subjectivity.  Huffer draws 
attention to how queer theory has left the question of the subject unaddressed through its 
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use (play) of psychology and psychoanalysis.15  If it is true, as Foucault argues, that 
sexuality has become fundamentally tied to being, then examining subjectivity and being 
will shed light on how sex, gender and sexuality shape and inform how subjects come to 
know and experience their being.  In History of Madness Foucault explains how, 
gradually over time, the mad or mentally ill were separated or split from rational subjects.  
He argues that this splitting of the mad from the rational ushers in the Cartesian subject, 
one that has a properly aligned rational mind and body. 
 While Huffer does not provide a reading of queerness under her own revised 
foundations of queer theory, I situate the subject of the transsexual and its 
genealogical/historical creation within Huffer’s call for a rethinking of queer theory.  
Rather than focusing on sex as an analytical category, I focus on the various ways in 
which differing discourses and epistemological fields act as technologies of Cartesianism.  
The systematic study and classification of the transsexual, the various and shifting modes 
of discourse within the medical and psychological fields, and the eventual joining of the 
two fields increasingly positioned the transsexual as a medicalized identity.  This 
medicalization of the figure of the transsexual placed and maintained medical 
professionals as the knowers of transsexual identity, while placing transsexual 
subjects/patients in a subject position of unreason that requires the interpretation of 
medical professionals. 
 As I will show, medical and psychological professionals debated the best 
treatment of the “problem” of transsexualism.  In the early part of the 20th century, the 
field of medicine moved toward a rational view of treatment that was focused on the 
body and the cure or treatment of bodily aliments.16  With the rise of psychology as a 
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professional field in the early part of the twentieth century, the medical community had to 
justify its particular treatment of transsexual patients.  The psychological community 
questioned surgery as a treatment for transsexual patients, choosing to focus on mental 
and psychological issues of transsexual patients.  Janice Irvine notes that the medical 
sexologists were able to gain legitimacy despite “the opposition of psychoanalysts (who 
accused them of collaboration with psychosis)…”17  Psychology and psychiatry18 thought 
of transsexualism as a form of dysphoria or psychosis that, with the proper treatment, 
could be cured or at least abated through psychiatric means.  Like homosexuality, 
transvestitism and transsexuality were thought to be psychological problems that 
developed out of childhood and lay strictly within the mind itself.  Essentially, 
transsexual patients were thought to be mad, suffering from a psychotic delusion.  In 
History of Madness Foucault writes that madness was, overtime, removed from the realm 
of reason and into the asylum, set apart from those with a rational mind.19  Though not 
declared mad in the seventeenth-century sense, the association of transsexuality with 
mental disorder continued to plague the figure of the transsexual, limiting access to 
treatment and placing the transsexual subject in a separate realm from rational persons.  
As an irrational subject, transsexuals were treated with suspicion and disdain.   
During the 1950s the psychological and medical communities were at war over 
which community could best treat transsexual patients.20  Yet by the 1960s – most 
notably through the work of Harry Benjamin – both sides of the aisle were (reluctantly) 
supporting each other by creating a system that incorporated both communities.21  As 
Meyerowitz notes, with the development of “gender identity” – or the internal 
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psychological feeling of gender – in the 1960s, more doctors began to use “the concepts 
of psychological sex or gender identity to support transsexual surgery.”22 
 Irvine examines the joining of the two professions in terms of legitimation.  She 
writes,  
 The development of policies and guidelines, such as the Standards of Care 
developed by the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association, 
provided surgeons with a medical rationale.  The inclusion of transsexualism as a 
mental disorder in the DSM-III provided additional therapeutic support.  One 
psychiatrist commented that the new classification “has legitimated gender 
dysphoria… in that it is now a legitimate psychiatric diagnosis…. The 
psychiatrists have been getting more acceptance now that they are validated by 
the DSM-III.”23   
The joining of the two communities illustrates two points.  First, the two communities 
strengthened their power and authority through joining.  Vying for control over the power 
to diagnose and treat transsexualism, the medical and psychological communities created 
a linking of the two fields through the standardized treatment of transsexual patients.  
Medicine began suggesting that transsexual patients seek out psychiatric or psychological 
help before starting physical treatment with hormones and surgery.  This particular 
linking of institutional powers provided greater power to each community while 
producing an identity or figure that was productive in terms of rhetoric and utility.  The 
figure of the transsexual is productive in that patients began using the narrative to have 
better access to surgery and psychological treatment, and productive of a usable figure of 
other institutional powers.  Further, the linking of the two fields aptly displays the 
function of Cartesian subjectivity.  In assuming that subjectivity is split into the mind and 
body, both fields assumed that both – though connected – could be treated separately and 
brought back into “proper” alignment.  Thus this linking of the medical and 
psychological fields becomes a technology of Cartesianism, whereby subjects are 
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examined and treated under the assumption that the internal psyche and the external body 
and desires should properly align. 
 In what follows I argue that the joining of the medical and psychological fields 
not only reinforced each field’s power over patients’ diagnosis and treatment, but also 
created various technologies of Cartesianism that placed the figure of the transsexual in a 
subjectivity position that is split between the mind and body.  This split, and the 
subsequent treatment/procedures that the medical and psychological professions 
produced, demonstrates the effects of medical and psychological rhetoric based in 
Cartesian subjectivity.  Because we hold the rational Cartesian subject as normative, the 
dissonance of the mind and body transsexuals experience positions the figure of the 
transsexual as an unintelligible subjectivity.  I start by looking at early sexologists in 
Europe to show how transvestites, inverts and eonists were part of the general sexological 
taxonomy.  The work of these early medical professionals shows the early beginnings of 
the figure of what would later become the transsexual through their case studies of 
patients.  Expressing a discordance of mind and body, patients helped early medical 
professionals formulate the transsexual narrative and shaped how medical professionals 
treated patients. 
 Next I look at the rise of the transsexual in a US context, starting with Christine 
Jorgensen.  Jorgensen’s public notoriety garnered attention from media outlets and the 
medical and psychological fields.  American doctors and the US population more 
generally became fascinated with transsexuals.  Doctors working with transsexual 
patients during the 1950s and ‘60s toed a line between fame and misfortune.  Dr. 
Benjamin, an endocrinologist born in Germany who worked with Jorgensen once she 
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traveled back to the U.S., became the leading medical professional for transsexual 
patients in the United States.  His work, initially skeptical of the psychological field, 
eventually came to incorporate psychological treatment as a way to legitimate his own 
belief that surgery was the answer for transsexual patients, and to provide a greater 
accessibility to treatment for patients.  “By the early 1960s,” Meyerowitz argues, “Harry 
Benjamin and a few others used the concepts of psychological sex or gender identity to 
support transsexual surgery.”24  Benjamin’s work, though the incorporation of 
psychology, displays the work of a Cartesian subjectivity system that splits subjectivity 
into the body and the mind that are simultaneously connected and separate.  Although 
exercised as a liberatory move allowing easier access to treatment, the coupling of 
medical and psychological discourse through Benjamin’s later work becomes a 
technology of Cartesianism that further reifies the interior/exterior split among 
transsexual patients. 
 Finally, I look at the various transsexual figures produced through the medical 
and psychological literature in the 1950s, ‘60s and early ‘70s.  Doctors – including 
Benjamin – often framed the transsexual patient as unreliable, a false narrator, disturbed, 
and willing to do anything to receive both attention and treatment.  It is these variations 
of the figure of the transsexual that aptly display the effects of a Cartesian system of 
subjectivity as productive.  Because transsexual patients are framed as unreliable, 
disturbed, mad and abnormal, they are unable to claim their own subjectivity.  Rather, 
medical and psychological professionals act as interpreters of transsexual subjectivity, 




Early Sexologists, Taxonomy and Cartesian Subjectivity 
 
 The rise of the medical profession in Europe in the late 1800s led to a 
medicalization of the body that systematized illness and its causes.  Additionally, the 
Victorian era, as Foucault argues, brought an incitement to discourse about sex and 
sexuality.  The combination of the fledging medical profession and the incitement to 
speak about sexuality led many medical professionals to believe “sex” and its various 
inflections of desires to be sites of medical illness.  In trying to achieve legitimacy for the 
field of sexology, doctors realized that “an emphasis on biology, and later biomedical 
science, was… crucial in achieving legitimacy and was linked to scientific solutions for 
such problems as venereal disease and prostitution.”25  
 As the medical profession’s rhetoric proliferated,26 doctors created a taxonomic 
system to classify illness and the body.  European sexologists in the late 1800s and early 
1900s sought to classify sexual illnesses and to further clarify sexual abnormality.  The 
writings of sexologists from this time period show that medical professionals were 
attempting to classify not only bodily illnesses, but also abnormal desire and expressions 
of sexuality.  Though the term “transsexual” did not exist in the medical community of 
the late 1800s and early 1900s, medical professionals like Havelock Ellis and Magnus 
Hirschfeld developed the terms “eonism” and “transvestite” to describe patients who 
cross-dressed or who experienced a crossgender identification.27  While Joanne 
Meyerowitz argues in How Sex Changed that the work of sexologists from the late 1800s 
into the mid-1900s demonstrated that sex was “neither as obvious nor as permanent as it 
might have seemed,”28 Meyerowitz’s interrogation of sex does not question how early 
sexologists influenced the subjectivity and experience of crossgender identification.  I 
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argue that the work of medical and psychological professionals used the Cartesian subject 
as their normative base when examining sexual illness, sexual deviancy and abnormality.  
 Of these abnormal figures, medical professionals focused on homosexuality, 
masturbation, prostitution, sexual inversion and transvestitism.  While we may think of 
sexual figures as separate today, early sexologists and their parsing of sexual deviancy 
allowed for slippages between categories.  For example, sexologists believed that 
homosexuals suffered from a type of sex inversion in that, while being biologically one 
sex, their habits, mannerisms and desires were that of the opposite sex.29  Yet the same 
medical professionals also believed that transvestites and transsexuals suffered from the 
same problem of sexual inversion, just to a heightened and varying degree.  Thus the line 
demarcating homosexuality and enonism or transvestitism was relatively permeable and 
subject to blurring.30 
 These early sexologists relied on a taxonomic and scientific system to relay their 
patients’ cases.  When taking case notes, sexologists would describe in detail their 
patient’s body, followed by a narrative of their patients’ lives and problems.  For 
example, writing in 1897, Havelock Ellis, a German psychologist, traces the “History of 
Miss D.” in Studies in the Psychology of Sex, Volume II.  Ellis begins with a bodily 
description of Miss D., who has developed as a female but has the “manner and 
movements somewhat boyish.”31  Further her “menstruation [was] scanty and painless” 
and Ellis describes her sexual organs as “showing some approximation toward infantile 
type with large labia minora and probably small vagina.”32 
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 While Ellis – like other sexologists – focused on the precise description of the 
body, it seems that the patients did not feel anything to be entirely wrong with their body.  
In fact in the narrative section of Miss D’s account she says, “I regarded the conformation 
of my body as a mysterious accident.  I could not see why it should have anything to do 
with the matter.”33  Rather it was her “likes and dislikes”34 and that she “was not allowed 
to follow them”35 that troubled her the most.  While doctors like Ellis were disturbed by 
their patients’ “abnormal” desires vis-à-vis their bodies, it seems that the patients 
themselves – Miss D. more specifically – were upset that their bodies and cultural 
expectations of their bodies were holding them back from expressing their own desires. 
Patients did not necessarily believe that anything was wrong with them, but viewed their 
own subjectivity as anomalous.  Rather it was doctors such as Ellis who medicalized the 
“problem” and in doing so, created a whole taxonomy around sexual deviancy.   
Another sexologist from Germany named Magnus Hirschfeld furthered the 
taxonomy of sexual deviancy in the early 1900s.  Rather than believing that sexual 
deviancy was a strict medical problem, Hirschfeld believed that various types of sexuality 
were normal and natural variations of human sexuality.  Hirschfeld believed in 
bisexuality in that “male” and “female” were never absolute.  Rather he indicated, “we 
have been able to prove that in every man, even if only to a small degree, there is his 
origin from the woman, in every woman the corresponding remains of manly origins.”36  
Hirschfeld’s conception of bisexuality allowed him to argue that homosexuals, 
transvestites, eonist and other sexual abnormalities were just natural variations of human 
sexuality.  As natural variants, those who were homosexual, transvestites or otherwise 
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identified should not be subject to persecution, but rather celebrated as part of human 
diversity. 
Hirschfeld’s theory of bisexuality had the most potential to undo the Cartesian 
subjectivity for sexual deviants.  His understanding, applied to all persons, would have 
framed even heterosexuals as bisexual in that each sex would have varying degrees of the 
opposite sex within them.  Further, Hirschfeld’s theory posited that the interior, exterior 
and desires did not have to align in any “proper” fashion.  Rather any permutation or 
combination was acceptable as a natural variant of human sexuality and desire.  Yet 
because of Hirschfeld’s work being burned in Germany during WWII, and his subsequent 
exile to the US, his liberal theory of natural variation in human sexuality did not develop 
into a dominant theory.37  Harry Benjamin, influenced by Hirschfeld, would later explain 
transsexuality using the “bisexuality” theory in his early work in the late 1950s and ‘60s.  
Yet as more medical professionals incorporated the psychological term “gender identity” 
or “psychological sex” into their work, the bisexuality theory fell out of use.38 
Through the medicalization of the sexual inversion problem, medical 
professionals capitalized on the Cartesian subjectivity system.  Because doctors in the 
mid- to late-1800s invested in a mind and body that are connected, medical sexologists 
believed that one’s sex and one’s actions and desires should align.  As Charles Rosenberg 
points out, the concept of the connected mind and body was accepted generally in 
medicine.39  Treating the body would have an effect on the mind, and vice versa.  When 
the body and the mind did not align, such as in sexual inversion, it was the job of medical 
and psychological professionals to rectify the “problem.” 
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It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the creation of the sexual invert’s 
“problem” – which later became the transsexual’s problem – was entirely the doing of 
medical and psychological professionals.  Patients actively helped doctors formulate the 
sexual invert’s problem through their own use of rhetoric.  As Miss D. says in her 
narrative, “I thought that the ultimate explanation might be that there were men’s minds 
in women’s bodies…”40  The rhetoric of being in the wrong body dominated the 
sexological explanations of sexual inversion and transvestitism and led medical 
professionals to the conclusion that there was a dissonance between the mind and body of 
such patients.  Miss D. further describes herself in her late twenties, saying “What I felt 
with my mind and what I felt with my body always at this point seemed apart” and that 
she “always imagined [herself] as a man loving a woman.”41 
The inversion theory is rooted in the Cartesian system of subjectivity because of 
its alignment with the nineteenth-century conception of the connected mind and body.  
The narrative of patients feeling as if they are in the wrong body led medical and 
psychological professionals to treat the “problem” of sexual inversion as if the body and 
mind needed realignment.  Such a framing, strengthened through the medicalization of 
deviancy in medicine, placed the figure of the sexual invert – in this case the furthest 
degree of inversion: eonism – as the target of what would become various technologies of 
Cartesianism – or ways in which the doctor sought to return the subject to a proper 
alignment of the mind and body.  Some patients did not view their bodily state as a 
problem (as Miss D. stated above), but rather feared the reactions of others and social 
rejection. Medical professionals and other lay people viewed their bodies and desires as 
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problems that only the medical community – keepers of the correct knowledge – could 
correct through scientific and taxonomic classification of bodies. 
The Modern Medicalization of Transsexualism, and the Warring Medical and 
Psychological Fields 
 
 Through the mid- to late-1900s, both the medical and psychological fields 
continued to revamp their taxonomies of sexual deviancy while exploring new concepts 
and procedures to make surgery safe.42  Not only did medical professionals parse out 
sexual deviancy and bodies – and therefore further complicate the debate about “sex” – 
but they also placed the transsexual figure further and further under the scrutiny of a 
Cartesian lens.  Through medical and psychological literature, the warring professions 
argued which field could properly treat transsexual patients.43  This war, carried out 
through a proliferation of research and writing, placed the transsexual under a medical 
lens concerned with the body, and a psychological lens concerned with the mind.   
 While, as Meyerowitz argues, “sex” changed through medical and psychological 
research, the lens of Cartesianism did not.  Despite the warring fields that Meyerowitz 
points out,44 both medicine and psychology later agreed on and utilized a rhetoric that 
described the dissonance of mind and body as a starting point for the treatment of 
transsexual patients.  As I will argue the rhetoric utilized became the focus of the two 
fields, the warring medical professions eventually linked in further support and 
actualization of Cartesian rhetoric: one to treat the mind, the other to treat the body.  I 
further argue, that the reluctant joining of the fields and the continuing split of the body 
and mind used the technologies of Cartesianism that, while rendering the figure of the 
transsexual as legible through the paradigm of illness, left the transsexual in a position 
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where one could claim such a subject-hood, but never be able to speak it without medico-
psychological help. 
 Starting the in 1950s in the United States, the figure of the transsexual became a 
media sensation and one of the central debates of the medical and psychological 
professions.  Both medical and psychological professionals further refined their 
taxonomy from that of early 1900s, bringing the transsexual into a distinct figure separate 
from homosexuality and transvestitism.  Joanne Meyerowitz and Susan Stryker both cite 
the Christine Jorgensen media sensation of 1952 as when the transsexual became a public 
figure and the birth of the medical and psychological debate over treatment of transsexual 
patients in the U.S.  Her notoriety, no doubt because of her beauty and sensational story, 
brought the figure of the transsexual to the public while causing an stir in the medical 
community. 
 After the media sensation of Christine Jorgensen, there was a proliferation of 
medical writing about transsexuals (also known as eonists in the early 1950s), and about 
the causes and treatment of transsexualism.45  Frequently, patients would contact doctors 
in hope of receiving the same surgery as Jorgensen.  In August 1955 edition of Sexology: 
Sex Science Illustrated, a letter to the editor of the magazine writes, “Then the case of 
Christine Jorgensen was published.  I had previously hoped that I could be changed 
likewise.  It only added to my sorrow.  I would just as soon die trying to be what I should 
be, as to continue to live as I am living.  Perhaps some day my hope will be fulfilled.”46  
As more people read about and identified with Jorgensen, patients tried to persuade 
doctors to provide the same kind of surgery.  While the majority of doctors were 
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unwilling to perform the surgery, a select few sympathized with their patients and sought 
to study transsexualism and further sex reassignment techniques.      
 Christian Hamburger, writing “Transvestism: Hormonal, Psychiatric, and Surgical 
Treatment” in the Journal of the American Medical Association in 1953 describes his 
research on eonism (another medical term for transsexualism) and some of its variants 
and its causes.  Hamburger calls those patients who have “a fundamental feeling of being 
victims of a cruel mistake – a consequence of female personality in a male body” as 
eonists.47  The eonist experienced the dissonance of the mind and body, thereby by 
differentiating them from transvestites, and further leaving the medical professional with 
the challenge of bringing the mind and body into accordance.  More importantly, 
Hamburger places the diagnosing and parsing of sexual abnormality in the hands of 
medical professionals: “only through clinical analysis is it possible to distinguish between 
these various states.”48 
 With Hamburger’s work the “problem” of the transsexual is medicalized and 
pulled into the medical profession through the claiming of special kind of 
knowledge/truth that only physicians can decode.  Hamburger’s claim for the medical 
community works in different and reinforcing ways: 1) it gives doctors control over 
diagnosis and treatment of patients and their particular “condition,” 2) places the patient 
in the position of subject(ed)/object and vis-à-vis the knowing doctor who has the ability 
to treat such a “broken” body/mind subjectivity, 3) qualifies transsexual subjectivity as a 
mode of being that can be claimed but never spoken intelligibly until there is medical 
intervention, and 4) continues to reify the split of the mind and body through the notion 
that each subject should have a properly aligned mind and body.  Thus the Cartesian 
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subject is once again the norm through which transsexuals are “deciphered” and brought 
into being as transsexual. 
 Hamburger notes that psychologists and psychiatrists have been unsuccessful in 
finding a cause and treatment for eonists: “It is reasonable to suppose that physical 
factors may play a decisive role, as evidenced by the frequent appearance of more or less 
pronounced feminine physical appearance.  On the other hand, there are eonists having 
completely normal masculine habitus.”49  Although Hamburg believes that signs of 
eonism can be traced to childhood, his focus on the body as a problematic site for eonists 
leads him to believe that a physical, surgical treatment is the better option.  Though not a 
cure, surgery, according to Hamburger is part of a medical ethics that “[when] a disease 
cannot be cured an attempt should be made to improve the stress and inconvenience of 
the patient in order to make his life as tolerable as possible, have, naturally, due regard to 
the interests of society.”50  Through his rhetoric and research, Hamburg believed that it 
was not only better to treat eonist with surgery than psychiatry, but also it was his duty to 
help the suffering patients.   
 By the early1960s, Harry Benjamin was the most prominent medical professional 
working with transsexual patients.  An endocrinologist born in Germany, Benjamin 
worked with transsexual patients and developed treatment using hormone therapy.  Yet 
over time, Benjamin developed a relationship with several of his patients that led him to 
believe that hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery were the best treatments for 
transsexual patients, or as he called them “TS” patients.  His belief that TS patients 
should be treated through surgery placed him in the center of the ongoing treatment 
debate among medical and psychological professionals.51 
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 Benjamin’s seminal work on transsexualism was The Transsexual Phenomenon.52  
Written in 1966 as a guidebook for other medical professionals, The Transsexual 
Phenomenon attempted to describe the transsexual patient, his/her “problem,” and the 
various methods used to treat transsexuality.  Although Benjamin meant for his work to 
have a liberatory effect – one of educating doctors about transsexualism and rooting out 
ignorance – Benjamin’s own rhetoric repeats the trope of the transsexual who feels 
trapped in the wrong body.  In a letter reproduced in The Transsexual Phenomenon from 
Sexology Magazine, one patient writes, “What can I do to end my misery?  In body I am 
looked at by others as male, but in my mind and heart I see myself as a woman.”53 
 Many letters to Benjamin from transsexuals seeking help contain similar pleas.  
One from J.C. in 1956 reads, “However your masculine body forbids, what your mental 
tortures beg for.  This has caused me trouble all of my life, and has brought considerable 
unhappiness in my family, as you can easily understand.”54  Another from T.L.C. in 1967 
reads, “[I] know that I’m a female imp[ersonator] & truly want to be a woman & not a 
man, & definitely not an imitation!”55  These letters indicate that people asking for help 
experienced a dissonance of body and mind.  Wanting to be a “woman… & definitely not 
an imitation” and blaming the masculine body indicate a disconnect between the interior 
and the exterior, the mind and body. 
 Showing Benjamin’s use of his patient’s narrative of being trapped in the wrong 
body, The Transsexual Phenomenon also clearly demonstrates that Benjamin rejected the 
notion that psychology could aid in the treatment of transsexuals.  In a section titled 
Psychotherapy in Transsexualism, Benjamin writes, “Psychotherapy with the aim of 
curing transsexualism, so that the patient will accept himself as a man, it must be 
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repeated here, is a useless undertaking with present available methods.  The mind of the 
transsexual cannot be changed in its false gender orientation.”56  Rather, Benjamin 
believed that, once treated with hormones and sex reassignment surgery, all psychosis or 
pathological behaviors would at least abate if not disappear altogether.  Benjamin 
questions the diagnosis of paranoia or schizophrenia so often given to transsexuals 
writing, “it was always a question in my mind how much of the psychotic reaction or 
how much of the psychoneurotic symptoms may be due to the thwarted sex life and 
gender discomfort of the transsexual state.”57  
 Psychologists and psychiatrists disagreed with Benjamin and other medical 
professionals.  As Irvine reminds us, medical sexologists were attempting to gain 
legitimacy over “the opposition of psychoanalysts (who accused them [medical 
sexologists] of collaboration with psychosis).”58  Writing in The Journal of Sex Research 
in 1968 Eric Sagarin, a psychologist, took Benjamin to task for developing his treatment 
of transsexuals around an ethic of sympathy, or what Sagarin believed was an ideological 
pollution of medicine.  Denouncing such sympathy-as-treatment logic as “unscientific,” 
Sagarin wrote, “deviation is seen as a normal manifestation of the human animal, and not 
an abnormal development, not because there is scientific evidence leading to this 
conclusion, but because such a conclusion is consistent with the image that one wishes to 
project.”59 
 Thus Sagarin accused Benjamin and his cohorts of doing unscientific work in an 
effort to project a positive image of transsexuals.  Moreover, Benjamin’s assertions that 
psychotherapy was unsuccessful in treating transsexuals equated with the denial of 
deviance because, to label a patient/body as deviant would be to expose the patient to 
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social stigma.  While Sagarin believed that doctors and researchers could themselves 
have values, he called for science to be value free.60  Thus despite the values of 
Benjamin, he, according to Sagarin, should have classified transsexuals as sexual 
deviants with severe psychological problems in need of psychological treatment, not a 
physical treatment.  
 Writing in The Journal of Sex Research Natalie Shainess explores the 
psychological gender development of homosexuals and transsexuals.  Shainess notes the 
concept of gender identity was still new when she was writing her piece in 1969.  
Research on gender identity formation was tentative at best, and Shainess highlights that 
research on gender development, particularly the age at which gender development 
occurred, was hotly debated.  Nevertheless, Shainess believes that transsexuals and 
homosexuals were sexual deviants that followed a prescribed gender identity 
development that was a perversion of “normal” gender identity development: “In 
considering sexual perversions Gershman’s (1967) interpretation of the meaning behind 
each pathological condition states that the transsexual has the delusion he is a woman, the 
transvestite has a strong yearning to be a woman but knows he is not, and the homosexual 
‘acts as if’ he were a woman.”61   
 Focusing on the transsexual narrative given in the context that Shainess provides, 
we see that transsexuals are just one sexual pervert on a sliding scale of insane 
femininity.  The transsexual is under the delusion that he is actually a woman, which 
indicates that his gender identity formation process went awry somewhere in 
adolescence, creating the patients as victims/subjects of a life altering pathological 
condition or madness.  Further she believes that transsexuals suffer from a “kind of 
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monomania, or uses a single overdeveloped maneuver as a way of life that fills in all 
kinds of gaps in a rigid compulsive manner… So, the transsexual is a very disturbed 
person – a psychotic – who fills his gaps and alters his reality with a delusional sex 
preoccupation.”62 
 Shainess is obviously recommending that “sexual deviants” need psychological 
counseling, not surgery.  She believes that “the transsexual is rivaled only by the paranoid 
who demands plastic surgery for his nose, in persuading physicians to alter reality to 
conform to delusion.”63  She may call it delusion, but Shainess was willing to recognize 
along with Benjamin that transsexuals express a feeling of disconnect between their 
biological bodies and their gender identity.  Again we see the trope of “a man trapped in a 
woman’s body” played again, just in a different form to advocate psychological treatment 
for the “psychotic” transsexual. 
 Both the position of Benjamin and Shainess reified the narrative of the transsexual 
as one of discordance and as a body/mind in need, albeit with differing aims.  The work 
of medical professionals and psychologists gave narrative form to a “condition” and a set 
of bodies.  This narrative of discordance, shaped and fashioned by differing ideological 
backgrounds, served to limit the number of bodies that fall into seemingly discrete 
taxonomies and shaped and dictated the splitting and treatment of the body/mind.  The 
development of the transsexual narrative through psychological and medical discourse 
created a limiting set of factors and beliefs about bodies and minds while dictating what 
constitutes an acceptable body/mind for treatment.  Moreover, by setting up discrete 
taxonomies for the transvestite, homosexual, and transsexual, the narratives of each 
served to lead doctors and the medical community to conduct a confessional mode of 
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treatment.  Before doctors would willingly treat a patient, the doctor first had to search 
out the “true” cause of the condition and definitively classify the body/patient into one of 
several clearly demarcated categories of deviance.  Thus, in a Foucauldian sense, the 
deviant, unintelligible and irrational body/mind, then as today, must be read as 
intelligible through investigation, interrogation and discrete codification of the body/mind 
before medical diagnosis and treatment can begin.  Moreover, the hope was that once 
treatment was completed, the once deviant body would be rendered “docile” and thereby 
fit into the normative social fabric and its institutions.64 
 Almost a decade after The Transsexual Phenomenon, Benjamin et al. begin their 
1973 article in The American Journal of Nursing saying, “Transsexualism is a disorder of 
gender identity.  Persons with this problem feel a lack of harmony between their 
psychological sex and their anatomical sex.”65  This simple definition offered by 
Benjamin has remained more or less unchanged.  When we think of transsexual or 
transgender persons, we tend to think of someone who is at war within one’s self and 
with one’s body.  The notion of a split mind and body existing in dissonance was further 
refined in the 1960s and ‘70s.  While Meyerowitz alludes to the mind/body dissonance as 
a problem for medical professionals, her emphasis on the dynamic meaning of “sex” does 
not examine the splitting of the interior and exterior to the mind and body.   
 Despite the debate between the medical and psychological fields, eventually 
Benjamin began to incorporate more psychology into his work.  In 1963 (and later 
reproduced in The Transsexual Phenomenon) Benjamin, giving advice to a young 
transsexual encourages her to find a good psychologist to help her through the process 
and “discuss[ing] the problem with someone who is understanding, who is not a 
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transvestite or a transsexual himself, and does not have the handicap of emotional 
involvement.”66  In The Transsexual Phenomenon, Benjamin advocates that potential 
patients spend a year living as the target gender before undergoing physical treatment.  
While still not using psychology explicitly, this year period eventually became the year 
spent with a psychologist who would eventually sign-off on surgical papers.  Writing in a 
psychology journal in 1971, Benjamin indeed allowed that environmental factors could 
act as “triggers, instead of being the true cause of the abnormality.”67  A 1979 volume of 
the Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law shows how Dr. 
Sarwaer-Foner believed that the physical aspects of transsexualism reinforced the 
psychological, writing “It should hardly surprise anyone that if organic factors operating 
towards diffusion or inversion of sexual role are present, they will interact with, 
reinforce, and be reinforced in their turn by the above-mentioned developmental 
intrapsychic environmental factors.”68 
 By the end of the 1970s, the linking of the medical and psychological fields 
around the figure of the transsexual further medicalized and pathologized the figure while 
definitively securing or framing the transsexual “problem” as a problem of a split and 
improper or unintelligible subjectivity. 
 
Conflict and (Ir)Resolution: Transsexual Figures 
 
 Through their encounter with transsexual patients, medical professionals and 
psychologists formed not only a taxonomic classification for transsexualism and its 
symptoms and treatment, but also opinions of the typical transsexual personage.  Though 
some doctors like Benjamin were willing to help transsexual patients and worked to make 
access to treatment easier, many patients were written off as mad, crazy, desperate and a 
 
57 
liability to doctors and the medical profession more generally.  In hearing many patients 
indicate feelings of being in the wrong body, many doctors believed that – regardless of 
surgical need – patients were suffering (as was always the case) from mental illness.  This 
“demanding drive” led some medical professionals to be leery of transsexuals.  Through 
the slippage of personal beliefs into medical rhetoric, doctors warned others in the field to 
be wary of transsexual patients and the potential danger to one’s medical career for 
treating untrustworthy patients.69 
 As doctors parsed the figure of the transsexual in their taxonomy and warring 
over treatment, medical and psychological professionals created several narrative tropes 
of the figure of the transsexual.  The creation of the variants of the transsexual figure 
shows both the limiting and productive nature of the two fields joining around a 
particular illness using a Cartesian model of subjectivity.  The creation of various figures 
of the transsexual (as untrustworthy, desperate and conniving) places the transsexual 
patient into a subjectivity that is always already questionable.  Such a trope renders 
transsexual subjectivity as one that can be spoken, but only unintelligibly, requiring 
medical and psychological intervention to properly translate the unintelligible identity 
into a “rational” and intelligible illness in need of correction.  Yet, the productive aspect 
of medical and psychological intervention was the proliferation of possible subjective 
transsexual positions.  Although these tropes limited transsexuals and further inhibited 
access to surgery, the production of these tropes illustrates the proliferation of discourses 
about transsexualism and sex and sexuality more generally.  
 According to Meyerowitz and Stryker, Benjamin developed a good rapport with 
his patients.  Often Benjamin himself served as the link between many transsexual 
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patients, acting as the liaison and introducing them to each other.  One could argue that 
Benjamin – though Meyerowitz does not go so far – created a network of transsexuals in 
diaspora across the U.S.  Benjamin’s intimate association with his patients provided him 
with a privileged look into the developing lives of transsexuals as they experienced the 
desire to transition and the transition itself.  Benjamin often repeated that the condition of 
the “true” transsexual is that of a severely unhappy individual.  The end of “Newer 
Aspects of the Transsexual Phenomenon” from The Journal of Sex Research is worth 
quoting at length: 
“Transsexuals, as a rule, are definitely not psychotic, but often show mental 
peculiarities aside from their sex and gender role disharmony, peculiarities that can 
contain neurotic, depressive, paranoid, schizoid, or merely sociopathic and eccentric 
features.  Asexuality is by no means rare.  There can also be an unfortunate character 
defect which I have come to think of as the ‘transsexual character.’  
“Transsexuals are deeply disturbed, unhappy people who deserve more sympathy 
and attention than they have so far received.”70 
 
Although meant as general comments, Benjamin’s rhetoric of a “transsexual character” 
generalizes a pathological character among all transsexuals and produces an interiority.  
Benjamin believed that that transsexuals were the “step-children of the medicine”71 and 
in need of greater medical care and research.  Yet it is striking that Benjamin made such 
general marks about transsexual patients if indeed he wished the medical community to 
have more sympathy for the patient and their “condition.”  Benjamin wrote that 
transsexuals “are often sent from doctor to doctor, each one trying to get rid of them as 
quickly as possible.”72  Indeed in 1955, a response from the editor of Sexology: Sex 
Science Illustrated noted that a doctor was often advised to “avoid entangling himself” 
with transsexual patients.73 
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 Comments like those of Benjamin and those cited in Sexology: Sex Science 
Illustrated demonstrate how the rhetoric of a “transsexual character” informed practice.  
For example, in 1972 a transsexual patient from Halifax, Nova Scotia was denied 
treatment because a prior patient became belligerent after surgery.  Fearing their own 
careers were in jeopardy, the attending doctors decided to end all surgeries and cut their 
sex reassignment program.74  Benjamin’s own words created a narrative of transsexual 
patients that is anything but appealing to medical professionals.  Writing about the “fierce 
and demanding drive” of some transsexual patients in How Sex Changed, Meyerowitz 
argues that doctors, “accustomed to deference, […] encountered patients whose 
determined demands surprised and annoyed them.  Even the more sympathetic doctors 
sometimes lambasted their patients.”75  Meyerowitz notes that many doctors researching 
transsexualism had their own agendas, yet Benjamin’s quote was probably read as a 
gentle reminder to doctors of what to expect when taking on a transsexual patient that 
was insistent on surgery.  Thus Benjamin’s own writing of the transsexual-seeking-
treatment narrative served to limit access to doctors and treatment because of the general 
characterization of the transsexual patient as needy, overbearing, and a general Pandora’s 
Box of problems. 
 Benjamin’s assertion that transsexuals are “unhappy individuals” with some 
particular tendencies to mental health and personality issues is striking when we consider 
that Benjamin did not believe that transsexuals were psychotic.  Benjamin rather believed 
that, if transsexuals were afforded the needed sympathy from the medical community, 
their “condition” could be alleviated either through therapy as a small child or through 
hormone treatment and sex reassignment surgery as an adult.  Perhaps Benjamin’s critics, 
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like Sagarin and Shainess, in the psychological field caused him to write such a statement 
conceding transsexuals as “disturbed” persons.  Nevertheless, Benjamin slowly began to 
incorporate psychology into his work. This incorporation of psychology had a price: the 
painting of the transsexual as mentally disturbed, demanding and untrustworthy.  As 
Shainess (discussed earlier) reminds us, transsexuals were considered by the 
psychological establishment as “very disturbed persons”76 who suffer from 
“monomania”77 and are rivaled only by the narcissistic paranoia of the man “who 
demands plastic surgery for his nose.”78  By 1980, Gender Dysphoria was added to the 
DSM-III and Harry Benjamin’s Standards of Care (which included psychological care of 
transsexual patients) was in place.79  In adding psychology to the treatment of transsexual 
patients, Benjamin and his colleagues could no longer argue that transsexual patients 
were not psychotic.  Rather through the joining of medical and psychological rhetoric 
transsexual patients were classified as mentally ill and therefore questionable.   
 Positioned as mad, transsexual patients were often thought to be desperate and 
willing to do anything to obtain surgery.  As one letter to Benjamin indicates in 1956, “[I 
am] willing to do anything in order to be transformed.  I do not seek fame or fortune, but 
only a chance to be able to breathe and live as a woman, and hope to make a wonderful 
person…”80  Also seeking help, another letter from T.L.C. reads, “All I know Dr. is that I 
feel I have a right on this earth to live a normal & happy existence.  I definitely know 
now this is the only way I can have it.”81  Framing sex reassignment surgery as the “only 
way” to correct the “condition” of the transsexual shows the insistence of the patients for 
surgery and the “obsessive” drive for surgery. 
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 As more patients wrote to and worked with medical and psychological 
professionals, other transsexuals seeking surgery learned the proper “transsexual 
narrative” that would garner access to surgery.  As Benjamin indicates, he preferred not 
to perform surgery on younger patients, and a history of homosexuality made him leery 
of performing surgery.  Framing transsexuals as untrustworthy and unreliable narrators, 
doctors often treated transsexual patients with suspicion.  As Benjamin warns in a 1971 
article in the American Journal of Psychotherapy, “In eliciting the early history of 
transsexuals, we must remember that – as a rule – these patients are very unreliable 
reporters.  Facts, fancies, and wish-dreams often intermingle to the detriment of 
diagnostic accuracy.”82  As unreliable reporters, transsexual patients are positioned as 
either mad and hiding the “true” character of the self because of their inability to 
differentiate between the imaginary and the real, or as conniving and willing to fabricate 
a personal narrative to obtain surgery.  In addressing the latter aspect of the transsexual as 
an unreliable narrator, Benjamin writes, “The situation can unfortunately be aggravated 
for the doctor by the fact that many of these patients know only too well what their story 
has to be in order to get consent for what they want.  Furthermore, their own 
overpowering obsession dictates their actions and make them disregard all medical 
advice”83 
 These various tropes or sub-figures of the transsexual – that of the obsessive, 
mad, desperate, and unreliable/untrustworthy transsexual – continue to place transsexual 
subjectivity in the realm of madness or unreason.  As a figure of unreason, transsexuals 
were not to be trusted, always subject to medical interpretation, and as such sent from one 
medical profession on institution to another.  The rational Cartesian subject is the model 
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through which transsexual subjectivity is read. The various tropes, though a positive 
aspect of medico-psychological discourse, fashions a popular notion of transsexualism 
and illness that necessarily includes mental disorder.  Thus while transsexuals were able 
to claim transsexual subjectivity and plea for help from medical professionals, such a 
subjectivity – always already medicalized in terms of unreason – cannot speak on its 
own.  Rendered unintelligible, transsexual subjectivity and its various tropes require 
medical translation, a set of knowers who can render transsexual subjectivity as 
intelligible and therefore usable.  The complex weaving of discourse, seemingly 
liberatory in nature (especially in Benjamin’s case) continues to be both limiting and 
productive.  Fashioned through Cartesianism, transsexual subjectivity and its inflections 
are productive in that there is a proliferation of transsexual subjectivities, yet limiting in 
that none of those subjectivities are positive or “normative.”  
Technologies of the Cartesian System, Usable Knowledge and Resistance 
 Through the linking of the medical and psychological fields, the figure of the 
transsexual was created and the “truth” of sex sought out through research and practice.  
Early sexologists set out trying to define the eonist, the homosexual and the transvestite.  
These early pioneers placed sexual illness – both mental and physiological – into 
categories of deviancy and paved the way for the medical and psychological fields of the 
1950s, ‘60s and ‘70s.  Popularized by Benjamin, the medical term “transsexual” became 
part of both popular and medico-psychological discourse.  With the advent of Christine 
Jorgensen, the media sensation and fascination with transsexualism inspired a 
proliferation of discourse about transsexualism and eventually a war between medicine 
and psychology over which field could better treat transsexual patients. 
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 The linking of the fields also further strengthened the assumption of a Cartesian 
subject that is split into the mind and the body.  Now the transsexual patient was to be 
treated through both fields, psychology to cover the mind or the interior, and medicine 
the body or exterior.  The splitting of the mind and body further reified the figure of the 
transsexual as an ill figure, one that is always already sick because of the dissonance of 
the mind and body.  No “cure” for transsexualism existed, only treatment in hope of 
making life easier for transsexual patients.  Because there was no “cure,” the treatment – 
split between two fields – placed the figure of the transsexual in a subject position that 
can be claimed but never understood.  The dissonance of mind and body is framed in 
unreason, naturally anti-rational and always already suspect. 
 Additionally, the warring fields of medicine and psychology and their eventual 
joining incited a proliferation of medicalized and popular discourses about transsexuals 
and transsexual subjectivity.  Medical and psychological professionals created “types” or 
tropes of the transsexual through their encounters with transsexual patients and research.  
These inflections of the figure of the transsexual furthered the positioning of the 
transsexual subject in the realm of unreason through the characterization of transsexual 
patients as conniving, untrustworthy, desperate and psychotic or pathological.  Positioned 
in unreason, transsexual patients were always already suspect and likely to be either 
ignored or shuffled from one medical professional to another. 
 The creation of the various transsexual figures was productive in that certain 
stereotypes of medicalized deviancy were rendered usable for other state and cultural 
institutions.  Just as Margot Canaday shows in The Straight State,84 the medical and 
psychological fields were key in producing usable technical and cultural knowledge 
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about sexual deviancy.  As the medical profession created particular kinds of knowledge, 
various state institutions utilized that knowledge to better understand sexual deviancy and 
create state and federal policies that shaped and defined who could and could not be part 
of the general populace.   
 In a more specific way, I show in the next chapter, using the various transsexual 
tropes and the joining of the medical and psychological fields as a framing, how law and 
the judicial system picked up on medical rhetoric and the various transsexual tropes.  As 
with the medical field, the transsexual before the law is split between the mind and body.  
As such the transsexual is once again produced an unintelligible subjectivity that requires 
interpretation.  The judiciary calls for medical and psychological professionals to 
interpret the figure of the transsexual for the judiciary.  This juridical move further 
strengthens the medico-psychological community’s position as the knowers of 
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TRANSSEXUALS IN THE COURTROOM: 
THE LINKING MEDICO-PSYCHOLOGICAL AND JUDICIAL DISCOURSE 
 
 
In the last chapter, I examined how the medical and psychological community, 
though conflicting at first, eventually joined in defining and treating transsexual patients.  
While the linked fields were concerned with finding a “truth” to the transsexual subject, 
the linking was also productive in several ways.  First the linking solidified the category 
of the transsexual, providing a working identity model for both doctors and patients.  
Second, the linking of the two communities provided a path to treatment for some 
transsexuals, however small a number. Third, the linking of the medical and 
psychological discourse produced tropes of the transsexual as dangerous, conniving and 
unreliable/untrustworthy.  These tropes worked as technologies of Cartesianism, placing 
the transsexual in a subject position that is always already questionable, mad and steeped 
in unreason. 
  While the 1950s and ‘60s saw the rise of the transsexual in both medical 
and psychological discourse, the contemporary social and political climate, coupled with 
transsexual and transgender activism, allowed discourses about transsexuality to 
proliferate.  As more transsexual patients fought for surgery and began to live their lives 
in the open and push for transsexual rights, the transsexual patient moved into the judicial 
system.1  In the 1970s and 1980s, several cases went before the courts concerning 
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transsexuals.  These cases range from issues with public dress, to employment, to health 
benefits.  In this chapter, I examine transsexuals in the courtroom and the linking of 
medical discourse with judicial discourse.  Turning to the judicial system shows the 
continuing effects of Cartesian subjectivity.  Utilized as such, these tropes continue to be 
a technology of Cartesianism that both limit and expand transsexual subjectivity by 
policing the borders of “proper” transsexual subjectivity. 
 Starting in the mid-1900s not only did the transsexual figure come into contact 
with the judicial system, but also with divisions (police, bureaucratic systems) of the state 
that are both individualizing and totalitarian in its methods.  In “Omnes et Singulatim: 
Towards a Criticism of Political Reason,” Foucault notes “… right from the start, the 
state is both individualizing and totalitarian... Its inevitable effects are both 
individualization and totalization.  Liberation can only come from attacking, not just one 
of these two effects, but political rationality’s very roots.”2  Foucault calls for a critique 
of political reason, or “the type of rationality implemented in the exercise of state 
power.”3  Through a genealogical method, Foucault shows the linkages of various 
institutions, such as the church and the monarchy, that produce the state while also 
tracing shifts in ideology over time.  For instance, Foucault demonstrates the movement 
from the relationship of the prince to his position as prince of a country to an “art of 
government” which is “a right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of 
the common good, as the jurists’ texts would have said, but to an end that is ‘convenient’ 
for each of the things that are to be governed.”4 
 If the state is both individualizing and totalitarian and concerned with the 
disposition of “things” to a convenient end, then how do individual subjects fit into this 
  
73 
multidirectional framework of the state that both idividualizes while also creating a 
totalizing effect for society?  In Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France, 1974-
1975, Foucault shows that, through the linking of psychological discourse and the judicial 
system, criminals were no longer just criminals, but criminals with a psychopathic 
tendency to commit crime.  In the middle of the eighteenth century, the law encountered 
a figure for which it had no law: a person who, with what appeared to be a sound mind, 
committed a crime with seemingly no motive.5  According to Foucault, the judiciary 
reluctantly called in psychiatrists to determine if the criminal was mentally sound.  Rather 
than answering the question of whether or not the criminal was suffering from a 
delusionary state, psychiatry turned to examine certain tendencies in childhood 
(isolationism, small acts of violence, insubordinate to parents) that became linked with 
the crime in question.  The criminal came to represent his or her crime.6 
 Foucault argues that, in the nineteenth century, with its “very constitution” at 
stake, psychiatry outside the asylum sought “to detect the danger harbored by madness, 
even when it is a scarcely perceptible, general, and inoffensive madness” in order to 
justify its position of power through its ability to detect social danger, even imperceptible 
danger.7  Because of psychiatry’s vulnerable position in the nineteenth century it is 
understandable that psychiatry would “very quickly [become] interested in the problem 
of criminality and criminal madness.”8  By linking itself with the judiciary, psychiatry 
was able to garner respect as a valid field, further substantiating its ability to diagnose 
and treat mental illness. 
 To better understand the concept of (criminal) mental illness and its functions, 
Foucault examines the constitution of an abnormal subject as one that transgresses the 
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law through problematic double transgression of both nature and the law.  As Andrew N. 
Sharpe argues, the transsexual figure fits within Foucault’s understanding of the 
“monster” because, when brought before the law, the transsexual transgresses the 
boundaries of natural law and institutional law.9  The transsexual transgresses natural law 
because she violates what is assumed to be a natural division of the sexes into male and 
female, and transgresses institutional law because she violates laws based on a clear 
division of the sexes for the act of procreation, sexual intercourse and marriage. 
Though not a criminal in the traditional sense, the figure of the transsexual 
followed much the same line as the petit fou (small crazy) that Foucault describes 
throughout his early work.  In the figure of the transsexual, the law encounters something 
for which it is not prepared.  While the categories of “male” and “female” and “sex” were 
well established in common law, the law could not account for a subject changing his or 
her sex – or the transience of sex – and the subsequent destabilization of the common law 
definition of sex.  The meaning of sex, as we will see, was until questioned assumed to be 
rather straightforward.  Common law understanding of “man” and “woman” did not 
require a strict and clear definition of sex, yet the figure of the transsexual before the law 
throws the meaning of “sex” into question. 
While Sharpe soundly argues that the transsexual fits within Foucault’s petit fou 
though its double transgression, Sharpe bypasses examining the transsexual as framed in 
madness.  I argue that the figure of the monster and the figure of the abnormal or mad are 
joined through the figure of the transsexual. Because the figure of the transsexual before 
the law is considered unintelligible – causing the medical and legal professions to 
perform a tortured acrobatics to find a “truth” to the transsexual subject – the doubling of 
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transgression, or the “monstrous,” finds its link with madness and unreason.  The subjects 
Foucault presents in Abnormal are not just those that fit the bill of the monster, but also 
those that seem to be verging on complete indecipherability or madness.  The 
monstrous/mad figure’s logic – in terms of actions, desires and subjectivity – seems to be 
completely unintelligible.  While Sharpe briefly mentions critiques of splitting the subject 
into a body/mind or psyche binary, it is precisely this mode of inquiry that has the 
greatest potential for rethinking transsexual and transgender subjectivity and the law, and 
subjectivity more generally.  
The implications of such an inquiry are that the transsexual subject is still judged 
against what Lynne Huffer calls the Cartesian subject;10 one that is “naturally” split into a 
body/psyche, rational/irrational binary.  With the rise of science and the revaluation of 
knowledge in the Renaissance, the Cartesian subject and reason take hold.  Thus “Reason 
itself (ratio) becomes an ‘event’ that not only divides the Renaissance from the classical 
age, but also divides the thinking subject from the nonthinking subject.”11  This split 
between the thinking and nonthinking subject ultimately defines the rational and 
irrational being. “The thinking subject’s use of reason to abolish madness from himself 
exiles the mad into the category of nonexistence”12 in a vicious cycle that continues to 
endlessly reproduce and reify the rational, non-monster and sane subject.  Foucault 
connects sexuality to those that “inhabit the world of unreason: the libertines, debauchers, 
prostitutes, sodomites, nymphomaniacs, and homosexuals…”13  The figure of the 
transsexual, I believe, can be added to that list. Compelled to speak its subjectivity, the 
figure of the transsexual – framed as monstrous and mad – is believed to be incapable of 
speaking her own subjectivity because the subjective interior and exterior do not align.  
  
76 
As I will argue, medico-psychological discourse, linked with judicial discourse, serves as 
an interpreter of the transsexual subject, to find the hidden truth of the transsexual’s 
being, and to hear it speak (in a metaphorical sense) a subjectivity before both the 
medico-psychological and judicial communities. 
 To better understand how subjectivity is wrapped up in the reproduction of the 
rational/irrational subject, Huffer argues that we must look back in order to look 
forward.14  Sharpe calls the hermaphrodite of the nineteenth century Foucault’s privileged 
subject.  By starting with this figure, we can trace a trajectory of discourses that, through 
many twists, turns, and divergences, still leaves its vestiges in contemporary discourse.  
Therefore, to understand the barrage of usable tropes created through the linking of 
medical and psychological discourse, we need not only to look at the figures created 
through medical and psychological discourse, but also those before the law in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.   
 First, I examine the case of Hurculine Barbin, a late-19th century hermaphrodite.  
Barbin’s case displays an early example of the legal implications of being “in the wrong 
body.”  While Foucault’s introduction to Barbin’s memoir argues that we feel a need to 
find a “true” sex, I argue rather that Barbin’s case shows the early workings of Cartesian 
subjectivity.  In History of Madness, Foucault locates the splitting of the subject in the 
transition from the Classical Age to the Renaissance in Europe with the rise of reason.  It 
is this splitting of the subject, where mind and body are separate but aligned, that creates 
the cultural and social dissonance of the hermaphrodite from the Renaissance through the 
mid-1800s with the rise in sexology, and later, as I argue, for the transsexual.  Linking 
medico-psychological discourse and the judiciary serves to further reify and reproduce 
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the Cartesian subject through the rooting out of the “truth” of the transsexual in the 1970s 
and ‘80s. 
 Secondly, I look at medical professionals and their work on the legality of 
transsexualism.  Through their writing of medical texts and various journal publications, 
medical and psychological professionals addressed some of the legal issues of sex 
reassignment surgery and cross-dressing in public.  Because the medical community 
exchanged ideas internationally, doctors were able to discuss which countries had laws or 
provisions for transsexual patients and which were more likely to welcome transsexual 
patients.  Additionally, I examine a set of letters from a transsexual patient in Nova 
Scotia and her legal battle to travel to another country for her sex reassignment surgery.   
 Lastly, I examine the case of Ulane v. Eastern Airlines from 1983. Initially hired 
as Ken Ulane, Karen Ulane served Eastern Airlines for twelve years prior to her sex-
reassignment surgery.  Once fired, Ulane filed suit against Eastern Airlines for 
discrimination and wrongful termination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
Before District Judge Grady was the issue of whether or not Title VII applies to 
transsexuals.  In my discussion I show how the polymorphous figures of the transsexual 
created in medical and psychological discourses are once again trotted out for the judicial 
system.  As I discussed in the last chapter, through medical and psychological discourse, 
transsexual patients were framed as conniving, desperate and untrustworthy.  As usable 
stereotypes, these tropes are used in the judicial system as a method of arguing against 
transsexual rights and as a method of policing the borders of “proper” transsexual 
subjectivity.  Not only is the judicial system concerned with the destabilization of sex, it 
is also asked to judge transsexual subjectivity through the various tropes of the subject in 
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the wrong body, the transsexual subject as unreliable, and the transsexual subject as 
dangerous to public well being.  Thus it is the linking of medico-psychological discourse 
with the judicial system that further substantiates the power that all three institutions 
exercise.   
Early Legal Encounters: The Nineteenth-Century Case of Herculine Barbin 
 Herculine Barbin is a tragic subject in the late nineteenth century.  Foucault found 
Barbin’s memoirs and her case record through his research in France.  Barbin’s narrative 
is interesting for the current inquiry because of her standing before the law, and tragic 
because she committed suicide shortly after completing her memoirs.  The development 
of the memoir shows the early linking of medical and judicial discourse, while also 
showing just how violent the valorization of the Cartesian subject can be. 
 Although the Barbin case and the transsexual of the 1950s are two different 
phenomenon separated by nearly one hundred years, I bring up Barbin here to show the 
similarities and dissimilarities between the two subject positions.  Certain aspects of the 
hermaphrodite carry over to the transsexual.  For Barbin, as with the transsexual of the 
1950s, the exterior (the body and desire) is unintelligible.  This exterior unintelligibility 
brings both the hermaphrodite of the nineteenth century and the transsexual of the 1950s 
to the Law.  However, the judiciary in Barbin’s case did not seem to be concerned with 
Barbin’s physical morphology so much as her external appearance, whereas transsexuals 
in the 1950s courtroom are in varying degrees defined through their physical bodies as 
well as their ability to uphold cultural standards of gender performance against a feeling 
of internal dissonance. 
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 Foucault begins his introduction to Barbin’s memoirs with the question, “Do we 
truly need a true sex?”15  By asking such a question, Foucault complicates the subject in 
three ways: 1) He questions the incessant need for a sex, 2) he questions or complicates 
the validity of subjectivity based on sexual markers, and 3) linked to the previous 
questions, he questions the need for a true sex, one that is always already extant, a truth 
that can be discovered.  Furthering Foucault’s argument, Thomas Puckett in “Foucault, 
Physics, Sexuality, and the Hermaphrodite” situates Barbin’s narrative in a larger 
historical context – or the “Logic of Sex where gaps and silences are recorded over with a 
complex mechanism of the sciences of modern nations.”16  Thus Puckett is not only 
concerned with “sex,” but also with the interconnections of multiple sites of discourse 
that serve to cover over the gaps in “sex.” 
 While I believe that Foucault’s questioning of the “truth” of sex and Puckett’s 
extension are important, I extend both arguments by examining Barbin’s memoirs 
through the lens of Cartesian subjectivity.  Using Foucault’s work as a frame, I show how 
Barbin’s narrative displays an abnormal and monstrous subjectivity before both the 
fledging medical community and the law.  Further, because of Barbin’s description of her 
bodily and emotional experience as a child, her memoir shows the internalization of 
shame and the beginnings of a discourse of an interior and exterior.  Though Barbin at 
first felt nothing was wrong with her body or her actions, she slowly internalizes guilt 
through her experience with other people, institutions and their issues with Barbin’s 
actions and body. 
 Barbin’s memoirs – and the search for a “true” sex – begin in childhood.  Barbin, 
having experienced the death of her father and her mother sending her to a convent in the 
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“house of L.,” grew up as a female.  Later moved to the convent of S., Barbin excelled in 
her studies and developed a loving relationship with Lea, another sickly girl at the 
convent.  Barbin was often punished for being at Lea’s side, holding her and sharing her 
bed. 
 At the age of seventeen, Barbin was admitted to normal school, and during her 
tenure there her body took on startling changes.  She writes, “My upper lip and a part of 
my cheeks were covered by a light down that increased as the days passed.  
Understandably, this peculiarity often drew to me joking remarks that I tried to avoid by 
making frequent use of scissors in place of a razor.  As was bound to happen, I only 
succeeded in making it thicker and more noticeable.”17  Despite her bodily changes, 
Barbin fell for Thecla, kissing her incessantly and being banished to sit through lessons at 
the edge of the garden away from the class.18  Later that year, during a storm at night, a 
particularly loud clap of thunder sent the naked Barbin bounding over beds and into the 
arms of Sister Marie-des-Anges.  In describing the incident Barbin note that an 
“incredible sensation dominated me completely and overwhelmed me with shame.”19  
Starting with this incident, Barbin refused to participate in school activities that might 
reveal her body, trying desperately to avoid the “passions that shake mankind” and the 
revelation that would be a “further torment” in her life.20 
 After receiving her teaching degree at age nineteen and becoming the head 
mistress of a school, Barbin developed a relationship with a woman named Sara.  Once 
her passions were discovered, Monsieur de M. (a prefect at the convent) and her mother 
waited for a confession from Barbin, which never came.  Finally after a month’s time, she 
took her situation to Monsieur de B. (Barbin’s hometown priest), confessing to him in 
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detail herself and her longings.  Monsieur de B. arranged for Barbin to meet with a doctor 
to further examine her condition.  Barbin describes the experience a frightening and 
torturous one, one that left no room for privacy.  The doctor tells Barbin,  
Here you must regard me not only as a doctor but also as a confessor.  I must not 
only see for myself, I must also know everything you can tell me.  This is a grave 
moment for you, more so than you think, perhaps.  I must be able to answer for 
you with complete assurance, before Monseigneur [sic] first of all, and also, no 
doubt, before the law, which will appeal to my evidence.21 
 
Here the linking of medical discourse and the law is apparent.  Barbin’s bodily 
evaluation, the scientific examination of the body and its condition, is directly linked to 
the legal implications of Barbin living as a different sex.  Barbin’s doctor knows his 
“evidence” will be called before the law to testify to the bodily condition of Barbin to 
explain her passions and actions.  The anxiety about Barbin’s bodily formation and desire 
speaks to the division of body and mind that Foucault is concerned with.  Barbin’s 
interiority does not match the exteriority of her body, nor does it match the exterior 
(transitive) desire she expresses for women.  The notion that the body, gender expression 
and desire must all align in a certain way shows a relatively early stage of what Judith 
Butler calls the heterosexual matrix, which assumes that sex, gender and desire should 
align in order to make an intelligible subject.22 
 The theme of confession is explicitly displayed in the doctor’s rhetoric.  By 
saying he is at once her physician and her “confessor,” he deploys a rhetoric that Foucault 
expressly notes in Sexuality One23 and again in Abnormal.24  According to Foucault, it is 
the notion of confession in the church in the seventeenth century that is linked and 
secularized with various institutions (education, medical, judicial).  Through the 
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assumption that there is some interior truth to the subject, confession becomes a “truth” 
seeking technology of power that produces an internalizing subject.  Confessing not only 
one’s desires and actions, but also one’s bodily experience and dissonance makes the 
Barbin doubly available to the exacting dynamics of confession and interiorization.  
 Thanks to the plan the prefect and the doctor devised, Barbin was to lead her life 
as a man.  Once the doctor completed his “voluminous report, a masterpiece in the 
medical style, intended to ensure before the courts a petition for rectification, which was 
to be ordained by the court of L., my birthplace.”25  Barbin, under court order, was 
subjected to yet another physical examination, which “in conformity with the report to 
which it led, the civil court of L. ordained that a rectification be made on the civil status 
registers…”26  Living as a man, Barbin was depressed and often without a job.  The end 
of the memoirs describes Barbin’s impending departure for the United States upon the 
Europe.  Describing her feelings of leaving all of those who helped her and protected her, 
she nonetheless notes that she needed to get away from her past and all those that know 
about it: “What strange blindness was it that made me hold on to this absurd role until the 
end?  I would be unable to explain it to myself.  Perhaps it was that thirst for the 
unknown, which is so natural to man…”27  Barbin presciently notes at the beginning of 
the memoir that she is upon the hour of her death, and Foucault appends his note to the 
end of her memoir, saying the body of “Abel Barbin” was found in February, 1868.  She 
committed suicide “by means of a charcoal stove.”28 
 Barbin’s narrative provides an early example of what sexology and medical 
science will further refine as the hermaphrodite.  Notably, this early depiction shows a 
medical and legal community concerned with maintaining the sex order.  Yet reading 
  
83 
Barbin’s narrative, other features read as if Barbin were homosexual/invert, or perhaps a 
transvestite.  Through the developing taxonomy of sexology, these confusing claims to 
sex and desire are parsed out into distinct categories.  Although Barbin would be 
classified as intersex today, it seems that many of the features of her narrative are present 
in the modern rendition of the transsexual. 
 Barbin connects her feelings of shame to her childhood and to her body, 
especially when exposed to others.  Though Barbin does not express it directly, it is 
apparent that there is dissonance between Barbin’s body and psyche.  By locating the 
origin of her “problem” in her childhood, Barbin precipitates the narrative of the 
transsexual while showing yet another early example of the problematizing of childhood.  
Barbin’s use of her childhood to locate her “problem” and the reaction of others to her 
body and desires.  And further, though Barbin never expressed a desire to live as a man 
(in fact it was her undoing), her dramatic (and involuntary) change from living as a 
woman to living as a man predates the transsexual narrative of the 1950s. 
 Removed from the medicalized language and the developing taxonomies of 
medical knowledge, Barbin herself thought her narrative sounded like madness, and yet 
felt compelled to tell her story.  Throughout the memoir she doubts that the reader will 
believe her: “I have to speak of things that, for a number of people, will be nothing but 
incredible nonsense because, in fact, they go beyond the limits of what is possible.”29  It 
is the transgression of the limit, the speaking of things unspeakable and unintelligible to 
our current way of thinking about subjectivity that Huffer calls, thinking the limit.  She 
defines this limit as “The paradoxical possibility of thinking’s impossibility, or madness, 
is thus the result of thinking itself: the fold of the outside or thinking the limit.”30    
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Through the connection of medical and judicial discourse, trying to listen to the speaking 
subject who, perhaps simultaneously, embodies reason and unreason (as they are “folds” 
of the same fabric), the possibility of thinking the limit of subjectivity, one that is not 
split into a body/mind divide, is possible. 
 As we will see in the next section, many of themes presented in Barbin’s case 
come up again in the court cases in the middle- to late-twentieth century.  The transsexual 
as speaking unintelligible desires, as needing medical certification of her “condition,” and 
as tragic are all displayed for the court.  This focus on medical certification and the 
“condition” of the transsexual highlights the rise of “abnormal individual” as a “shift 
from the body to the soul as the object of legal concern.”31  Further, the “advances” in the 
medical and psychological fields, joined together (as discussed in the previous chapter), 
add additional themes to the courtroom menagerie: the transsexual as desperate, as 
unreliable, as dangerous, as deceitful.   
The Law as Afterthought: Doctors’ Musings on Transsexual Law and the 
Transition from the Operating Room to the Court Room 
 When the transsexual phenomenon exploded in the U.S. with the media sensation 
of Christine Jorgensen in the 1950s, the developing bureaucratic state – just learning how 
to better track and contain homosexuality32 – was surprisingly both fascinated and 
terrified of transsexuality.  Susan Stryker in her Transgender History notes that the 
public’s fascination with the advance of science played into the media hype surrounding 
Jorgensen and her “sex change” operation.  Not only could technological science split 
atoms, but also “apparently, turn a man into a woman.”33  The sheer sensationalism 
compounded with popular media kept the transsexual in the mind of the populace, yet 
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surprisingly out of the courts.  The discourses the media used, that of changing from one 
sex to another, allowed the public to believe that, once a transsexual completed the 
transformation, he or she was simply of the opposite sex.  Succinctly, transsexuality was 
not popularly thought of as a legal matter.  While Jorgensen, the ex-GI turned blonde 
beauty, hinted at anxiety surrounding masculinity post World War II, Jorgensen was 
generally not thought to be a legal menace either because of her sensational story, or 
because of her highly feminized appearance persona. 
 While there are only a few early legal cases of transvestites and transsexuals from 
the early 1900s to about 1950, the legal question of the transsexual post-Jorgensen was 
largely an afterthought.  This slow movement of the transsexual into judicial discourse 
could be for two reasons: 1) there were so few transsexuals (post-op) in the U.S. that few 
if any encountered legal problems concerning their sex, or 2) the state was not concerned 
with transsexuality until after the McCarthy era and the “liberal moment” of the 1970s 
with all its various social movements.  In either case, doctors were already writing about 
the legality of changing sex before the courts were.  In multinational correspondence, 
doctors from Europe and the U.S. wrote about legal codes pertaining to transsexuality, 
discussing the differences among countries, and explaining some of the legal questions 
patients may have.34 
 Christian Hamburger, writing in 1953, remarks in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association that the legality of castration varies from country to country.  Some 
countries such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden made “voluntary castration possible when 
the patient’s sexuality make him prone to commit crimes, thereby making him a danger 
to society, or when it involves mental disturbances to a considerable degree, or social 
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deterioration.”35  In 1963, Harry Benjamin’s form letter to male transsexuals warns, “The 
law, too, may cause you many difficulties and complications, even after the operation.  
Much red tape stands in the way for you to have your birth certificate read ‘female’ 
instead of ‘male.’  But you may need that for a new job, or if you should want to get 
married as a woman.”36  Benjamin, writing later in 1971 for the American Journal of 
Psychotherapy, believes that many of the problems transsexuals face could be alleviated 
by the relaxing of certain laws, namely the “vagrancy” laws that prohibit dressing as the 
opposite sex in public.37  Doctors like Benjamin, concerned with the legality of the 
operation that they would ultimately perform, looked to discuss the legal implications of 
such a procedure while looking for methods of change. 
 Meanwhile, transsexual patients in the 1970s began lobbying the judicial system 
for rights to change their name, birth documents and other legal forms, as well as rights to 
marriage and work.  As Joanne Meyerowitz points out, in an era post Brown v. Board of 
Education, “more individuals chose to pursue their civil rights in the courts, and by the 
1960s, with the rise of judicial activism, they had some expectation that they might find 
judges to back them.”38  This moment in the 1970s is what Meyerowitz calls the “Liberal 
Moment.”39  Starting with Harry Benjamin and the Erickson Educational Foundation, 
transsexuals and transgender individuals used existing networks40 to form transsexual 
rights organizations.  Additionally, doctors began forming institutional organizations post 
WWII in an effort to organize research about transsexuality.     
Despite the efforts of doctors and transsexual/transgender organizations to 
provide and lobby for better access to treatment and sex reassignment surgery, some 
transsexuals still found access to gender identity clinics legally difficult.  H.K., a 
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transsexual from Nova Scotia in 1972, began the process of transitioning with the help of 
a hospital doing research on transsexualism when funding was suddenly pulled for the 
program.  The program performed one sex reassignment surgery, and H.K. was slated 
next.  Writing to Dr. Charles Ihlenfeld for assistance, H.K. explains that the previous 
patient has “aggressive behavior” post-surgery.41  After visiting her psychiatrist, H.K. 
confirms, “I saw my psyciatrist [sic] yesterday and received some definite but bad news.  
The gynecologist surgeon told him that he would do no further re-assignment 
operations... I was told what amounts to the old cliché ‘Once burned, twice 
shy.’”42H.K.feels cheated and that it “is seems to me to be grossly unfair and unjust to be 
judged on the behavior of a previous patient without so much as having been seen 
personally by this surgeon.”43 
Virginia Allen, once Benjamin’s assistant who later became the assistant of Dr. 
Ihlenfeld, writes that, should H.K. be able to make her way to New York, that Dr. 
Ihlenfeld and others would be happy to help her.  It seems that H.K. attempted to take 
them up on the offer, or attempted to fly to Holland for the operation.  Yet, when 
applying for a visa, the US Consul in Halifax rejected her applications, “because I was a 
‘sexual deviate.’  I was very much surprised and deeply hurt that I should be classed the 
same as rapists, child molesters and people of such nature.  I have never been in trouble 
with the law.  I did not conceal anything and was honest with the consul.”  Her passport 
has her “male name” and her “alias” on it.  She says, “So you can see even if one desired 
one could not even seek medical help in the U.S. except by devious means.”44 
H.K.’s case shows the difficulty of reaching surgery, even once institutionalized.  
Further, H.K.’s attempt to receive a visa to the U.S. shows the legal limitations of 
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transsexuals; especially those who wish to immigrate to the U.S. for surgery.  While the 
courts in the U.S. were attempting to parse out how transsexuals fit into the national 
citizen body, the 1970s were not always the “Liberal Moment” that transsexuals 
(especially those outside the U.S. and Europe) and doctors hoped for.    
Yet many of U.S. court cases from the late 1970s and early ‘80s concerning 
transsexualism underscores Meyerowitz’s dubbing the late 1960’s and ‘70s as the 
“Liberal Moment.”  Transsexual patients and activists were successful in utilizing the 
courts as a mode of resistance to the oppression that had been building since the late 
1800s.  Thus not only was the court able to further strengthen the power it and the 
medico-psychological field had, but was also able to provide a crack in the totalizing and 
individualizing system.  These cracks acted as sites of resistance for transsexual patients 
and sympathetic medical professionals. 
The City of Chicago v. Wallace et. Al: Resistance and A Call for Increased Medical 
Evidence 
 Early cases dealing with transsexuals were mainly concerned with the legal 
altering of identification documents, the ability to dress to desired gender expression, and 
marriage.  Susan Stryker shows that most early litigation (from about 1850) in the courts 
centered on cross-dressing and the fear of same-sex marriage through the blurred 
distinction of men and women.45  Later cases like The City of Chicago v. Wallace Wilson 
et al.46 in 1978 examined the ability of a pre-operative transsexual to dress as their 
desired gender in public or on job discrimination, usually argued under specific 
municipal codes, the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  
 In Wallace, two pre-operative transsexuals were arrested for dressing as women in 
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public.  The court had to decide if the rights of the individuals were violated, and if being 
a pre-operative transsexual were permitted to cross-dress in public as part of their 
treatment.  Initially, the defendants, both pre-operative transsexuals, argued that the 
Chicago Municipal Code 192s8 was “unconstitutionally vague, overly broad, and denies 
them equal protection under the law on account of sex” under the First, Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.47  Justice Moran finds that, as applied to the defendants, 192s8 
is unconstitutional, but does not want to address its vagueness or the issue of equal 
protection.  Citing Richard v. Thurston (1970), he notes that, while the choice of 
appearance is not considered a fundamental right, “the State is not relieved from showing 
some justification for its intrusion.”48  Justice Moran believes that the context under 
which such a right is asserted should be examined, as Kelly v. Johnson (1976) suggests. 
Chicago v. Wallace Wilson provides an example of the “Liberal Moment” where 
transsexuals were able to use the court system as a means of resistance.  Yet strangely 
enough, the case has been ignored by academics, while also being listed as one of the top 
forty cases for LGBTQ Americans in the past forty years by Lambda Legal.49  To show 
the beginnings of a connection between the medical and judicial fields, I contextualize 
Wallace in the “Liberal Moment” that Meyeowitz examines, showing that, while relying 
on medico-legal literature rather than professional testimony, Wallace’s dissenting judge 
on the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly calls for medical testimony from the stand, thus 
setting the stage for following cases.  
Because both defendants claimed to be undergoing therapy in preparation for sex 
reassignment surgery, Justice Moran looks to the medico-psychological literature to 
explain the process of transitioning.  More specifically, Judge Moran cites several 
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medical and medically informed legal works about transsexualism and the law in his 
decision with the comment “wherein it is noted that cross-dressing is recommended as 
part of a sex-reassignment preoperative therapy program.”50  Because dressing as the 
target sex is suggested prior to surgery, and because the defendants were not engaged in 
sexually deviant behavior, Justice Moran finds “we cannot assume that individuals who 
cross-dress for the purposes of therapy are prone to commit crimes.”51 
In addition to his argument against the state’s assertion that the municipal code 
aids in the detection of criminals, Judge Moran argues that the state would be inconsistent 
in its treatment of transsexuals should it continue to enforce the municipal code because 
the state of Illinois has already provided legal means of changing birth certificates for 
post-operative transsexuals.  Through the enactment of section 17(1)(d) of the Vital 
Records act of 1977:   
which authorizes the issuance of a new certificate of birth following sex-
 reassignment surgery, the legislature has implicitly recognized the necessity and 
 validity of such surgery.  It would be inconsistent to permit sex-reassignment 
 surgery yet, at the same time, impede the necessary therapy in preparation for 
 such surgery.  Individuals contemplating such surgery should, in consultation with 
 their doctors, be entitled to pursue the therapy necessary to insure the correctness 
 of their decision.52 
By calling the medico-psychological field into the court, Justice Moran at once 
lends creditability to his decision, while also buttressing the power of the medico-
psychological field to determine, diagnose, and treat transsexual patients.  But more 
importantly, the linking of the judicial and medico-psychological fields, though serving 
to bring the figure of the transsexual under further surveillance, also provides a means of 
resistance.  Initially, a lower court dismissed the defendants’ claims.  Yet on appeal, the 
defendants were able to have the motion to dismiss overturned, and thus won their case. 
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Interestingly, the short dissent by Justice Ward displays many of the figures of the 
transsexual from the medical literature, and that will be seen again in Ulane v. Eastern 
Airlines.  First, Justice Ward calls for more proof from the psychological community, 
citing that “The only testimony in support of the defendants’ claim was that of the 
defendants themselves.  No psychiatrist was called to testify…”  53Despite Justice 
Moran’s reference to the medico-legal literature on transsexualism, Justice Ward presents 
an exemplary appeal to the psychological community while simultaneously bringing up 
the figure of the unreliable transsexual patient.  Because transsexuality is a medicalized 
condition in the eyes of the court, the patients are assumed to not be able to make their 
own claim to their transsexual status in the courtroom.  Not only does Justice Ward want 
the transsexual patients’ testimony, but also the presence and testimony of medical 
professionals.  Both the call for more substantive proof and the trope of the unreliable 
transsexual continue to fix the transsexual patient as at once incapable of making a claim 
about her own subjectivity, while condemning her to an extra burden of proof because 
her claimed identity.   
This doubled cycle, placed within the medico-psychological and judicial fields, 
continues to questions the subjectivity of the transsexual and her right to speak for 
herself.  The framing of the Chicago statute and the prosecution in Wallace – that of 
danger to the public through cross-dressing – shows that the figure of the transsexual 
meets the qualifications of the “little monster” that Sharpe describes.54  Yet it is also this 
inability to speak an intelligible subjectivity (madness) that forces the judicial system to 
call for an interpreter: the medical and psychological fields.  The need for such an 
  
92 
interpreter highlights the splitting of subjectivity into reason and unreason, whereby the 
“unreasonable” subject is assumed to be incapable of speaking her own subjectivity. 
Though not the first case to argue for transsexual rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments or municipal codes,55 The City of Chicago v. Wallace et al. 
highlights transsexual patients standing before the law claiming their own subjectivity 
with the help of interpreters of their “condition.”  Or, put another way, transsexual 
patients took to the courts to defend their subjectivity.  Indeed, the decision in favor of 
the defendants shows the willingness of the court to acknowledge the transitioning 
process for transsexuals, and, further, the court expressly stating that transsexuals cannot 
be assumed a danger to the public because of their dress.  No doubt this liberatory aspect 
of the case led Lambda Legal to place The City of Chicago v. Wallace et al. on their list 
of the forty most important cases in the last forty years.56   
However, as transsexuals encountered the judicial system more frequently, the 
judicial system called for medical testimony, not just published medico-legal opinions.  
In calling for more medical interpretation, the judicial system effectively links medico-
legal discourse while simultaneously positioning the transsexual subject as one that 
cannot come before the law without medical interpreters.  The call for greater amounts of 
testimony and an increased involvement of the judicial system in the lives of transsexual 
subjects, however, goes unnoticed by Lambda Legal.  While Lambda Legal points out the 
“positive” and liberatory aspects of the decision, I wish to point out its effects.  In fact, 
just six years later, medical professionals played a key role in the district court decision 
of Ulane v. Eastern Airlines.  As the following reading of Ulane v. Eastern Airlines will 
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show, the various tropes of the transsexual continue to highlight the linking of judicial 
and medico-psychological discourses and the split subject of reason and unreason. 
The Menagerie of Ulane v. Eastern Airlines 
 Ken Ulane served Eastern Airlines for twelve years prior to transitioning.  Eastern 
Airlines fired her after becoming Karen Ulane, and Ulane filed suit against her 
termination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  District Judge Grady had to 
decide if Title VII applied to transsexuals and if Ulane was fired because of her sex.  
Questioning how transsexual patients go about winning their case in court, Anna 
Kirkland believes that Ulane is an example of a transsexual winning through expert 
testimony and a close and “well adjusted” approximation of womanliness.57  Lisa Bowers 
argues that Ulane case “show[s] that sexually ambiguous subjects may create instability 
in legal discourse” and further suggests “moments in which the law recognized 
nonidentity as well as the legal tendency to contain the insights such moments might 
afford.”58  Rather than situate the Ulane case in the terms of nonidentity, I expand 
Kirkland’s argument that Ulane was indeed a stereotype in the courtroom, but in a 
different way.  The decision Judge Grady delivers in Ulane shows that medical 
professionals were called in to testify to Ulane’s status as a transsexual and her ability to 
perform her duties as a pilot.  Throughout the case, the tropes of the transsexual – 
identified in chapter one – play out before the court through Eastern’s arguments.  By 
calling in medical and psychological professionals, the court again places Ulane in a 
position of being able to claim a subject position without being able to speak for it alone.  
Thus the figure of the transsexual is again rendered in madness as an unintelligible 
subject, one that requires medical and psychological translation for the court. 
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 On April 24, 1981, Karen Ulane, after her successful sex-reassignment surgery, 
received a discharge letter from Eastern Airlines that listed five specific reasons for her 
discharge.  First, Eastern Airlines believed Ulane to be a danger to both passengers and 
crew.  Second, Ulane’s first class medical certificate was conditional rather than 
unconditional.  Third, Eastern Airlines believes that sex-reassignment surgery does not 
cure underlying psychological problems of transsexuals.  Fourth, allowing Ulane to fly 
would counter act with Eastern Airline’s policy to “assure the public that airline travel is 
safe.”59  And lastly, the Eastern Airlines lists its fifth reason as, 
To the extent the operation and the counseling you have undergone have been 
successful in changing your essential nature from male to female, it has changed 
you from the person Eastern has hired into a different person.  Eastern would not 
have hired you had it known you contemplated or might in the future contemplate 
such an action.60 
 
 In the termination letter as at trial, the tropes of the transsexual frame Eastern 
Airlines’ arguments.  Eastern Airlines believed that as a transsexual, Ulane was a danger 
to both passengers and crew and interfered in Eastern’s ability to assure passengers of 
safe air travel, positioning her in the “dangerous” transsexual trope.  Eastern Airlines also 
accuses Ulane of falsifying documents and lying to the company about her treatment 
through hormone therapy.  Further, Eastern Airlines believed that Ulane falsified 
documents leading to her sex-reassignment surgery, duping doctors and then editing 
medical documents after the fact.  By framing Ulane as conniving, Ulane is also accused 
through the trope of the deceitful transsexual. 
 At trial, Eastern Airlines additionally claimed that Ulane did not have standing 
under Title VII because the company did not fire Ulane based on her sex.  Further, 
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Eastern claimed that Ulane was not a transsexual, but rather a transvestite.  Using 
Eastern’s arguments as a framework, Judge Grady methodically examines each trope and 
its accompanying accusations, showing why each accusation is a pretense on the part of 
Eastern Airlines.  Seeking to find the “truth” of Ulane in light of these tropes, Judge 
Grady uses the testimony of the expert witnesses to debunk the misunderstandings of 
transsexualism.  Undergirding his argument against the transsexual tropes is the notion of 
“sex” as a category protected under Title VII, and his working definition of sex more 
generally. And finally, if “sex,” as read in Title VII applies to transsexuals, then the 
question becomes was Ulane fired for her transsexualism?  Thus before he can address 
the transsexual tropes and whether or not Ulane was fired for her transsexualism, he must 
first address the issue of “sex,” whether or not term “sex” applied to Ulane under Title 
VII. 
 The issue of sex, especially under Title VII initially seemed clear.  Judge Grady 
remarks that most cases prior to Ulane held that Title VII does not apply to transsexuals. 
In fact, arguments suggest that Congress did not have any intention of providing 
protection for homosexuals and transvestites under Title VII, and therefore transsexuals 
are to be included with homosexuals and transvestites.  Judge Grady, however, believes 
the argument placing transsexuals with transvestites and homosexuals to be invalid.  As 
shown in the last chapter, definitions and taxonomy play a crucial role in creating the 
identity bounds of transsexual patients.  Judge Grady argues that homosexuals and 
transvestites do not have “sexual identity problems… Transsexuals, on the other hand, 
are persons with a problem relating to their very sexual identity as a man or a woman.”61  
Further, Judge Grady notes that, based on the testimony at trial, there is no “settled 
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definition in the medical community as to what we mean by sex.”62  For the purpose of 
his decision, Judge Grady relies on the testimony of Dr. Green, who believes that sexual 
identity “is in part a psychological question,” a matter of “one’s own self-perception,” 
and “a social matter.”63 
 The combination of self perception and the social (read bodily) perception places 
the transsexual figure squarely in the divided subjectivity of body and mind, where a 
subject is assumed to have an interior and exterior that are linked and assumed to 
naturally align.  For the case of Ulane, Judge Grady uses the notion of alignment of social 
and self-perception to define sex.  He rejects the notion that chromosomes are the final 
factor in defining sex, and relies on Ulane’s change of birth certificate to read female 
under an Illinois statute (enacted by the people) to determine Ulane’s sex.  Because Ulane 
feels herself to be a woman, and is considered socially – through the state and society – 
as a woman, Judge Grady believes Ulane to be a woman.  More generally, he remarks 
that the evidence in the record of the case shows that “sex,” in both the legal and medical 
sense, should also include “sexual identity,” and, “therefore, transsexuals are protected by 
Title VII.”64 
 Second to the question of sex is whether or not Ulane is really a transsexual.  
Eastern Airlines contended that Ulane was not a transsexual, but a transvestite.  
Testifying for the defense, Dr. Arbitt believes that Ulane “conned her way into an 
operation”65 despite really believing herself to be a transvestite and her fear of losing her 
job.  Ulane’s physician, Dr. Berger, testifies that he did not simply rely on Ulane’s 
narrative, but that Ulane fits the DSM III criteria for transsexualism, not transvestitism.  
Judge Grady further strengthens Dr. Berger’s testimony by looking at Ulane’s personal 
  
97 
history.  Ulane was thirty-eight when the decision to transition was made, “the plaintiff is 
in the upper range of intelligence” and was “capable of understanding all the implications 
of what it was she was doing.”66  Based on his examination of her character and Dr. 
Berger’s testimony, Judge Grady finds that Ulane was not a deceitful transvestite and was 
fully aware of the consequences of her actions. 
 The question of Ulane’s status as either a transvestite or a transsexual highlights 
just how slippery the taxonomy continues to be.  Despite nearly fifty years (in the U.S.) 
of doctors bantering about how transsexualism and transvestitism should be defined, it 
appears that the categories could still be construed to mean either someone who cross-
dresses or someone who wishes to change her sex.  This need to constantly define and 
redefine transsexualism serves to mark transsexual bodies and desires as always already 
verging on the edge of intelligibility.  In a further effort to contain the transsexual 
identity/figure, doctors are called in as interpreters, having the authority to speak about 
the transsexual identity.  Despite Ulane’s ability to speak about her own subjectivity, 
Judge Grady not only calls in the medical and psychological fields, but also does his own 
interpretation of Ulane.  The linking of medico-psychological and judicial rhetoric allows 
Judge Grady to hear transsexual subjectivity spoken, but also gives him the authority to 
determine a proper transsexual subjectivity. 
 Judge Grady’s decision on how to determine sex is interesting in conversation 
with Andrew N. Sharpe’s reading of the British case of Corbett v. Corbett.  Concerned 
with marriage, Judge Ormrod J. found that chromosomal testing defined one’s sex for the 
terms of marriage to be met.  Sharpe argues that such a “sex” test was devised in Corbett 
v. Corbett to avoid the issues of homosexual marriage, believing that a post-operative 
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transsexual could possibly marry a member of his or her own biological sex.67  Judge 
Grady’s decision contrasts with OrmrodJ.’s decision in that his definition of sex is based 
on both social and psychological factors, and is therefore more expansive than a singular 
biological determinant.  His liberal interpretation of “sex” allows him to bolster his 
arguments against the transsexual tropes and directly plays into the “Liberal Moment” of 
the preceding decade.  
 Having answered if “sex” applies to transsexuals and if Ulane herself is a 
transsexual, Judge Grady then answers the question of whether or not Ulane was fired for 
her transsexualism.  Implicit in Judge Grady’s questions is whether or not bias, 
stereotypes and general misunderstandings played a role in Ulane’s firing.  Judge Grady 
examines the actions of Eastern’s legal team, the testimony of Ulane’s coworkers as to 
the “danger” she presented, Ulane’s lack of an unconditional medical certificate, whether 
sex reassignment surgery is meant to “cure” psychological disorders, how Ulane 
undermines Eastern’s ability to assure passengers of safe travel, and whether or not 
surgery changes the patient completely from the pre-operative self. 
 It is unusual that Eastern’s legal team coordinated Ulane’s firing.  Judge Grady 
believes that “Here the lawyers were in charge from day one and screened everything that 
happened” and that the team “carefully drafted the two discharge letters in an obvious 
attempt to avoid liability under the sex discrimination law.”68  By putting the legal team 
on Ulane’s termination case, Eastern effectively admits to being aware of the possible 
legal implications of Ulane’s termination.  Under normal circumstances, as Judge Grady 
notes, the process Eastern followed would be legal, so long as the terms cited in the 
termination letter are not pretenses. 
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 Turning to the first issue, Judge Grady attempts to see just how Ulane presented a 
danger to both passengers and the crew.  In testimony Judge Grady examined both Dr. 
Millett and Captain Causey to explain just how Ulane posed a threat to safety.  When 
pressed, Captain Causey sited a “question of trust,” though exactly what trust constituted 
he could not answer.  Turning to Dr. Millett, Judge Grady found that Dr. Millett – 
knowing little about transsexualism, made a couple of phone calls for his information, 
finally ending with Dr. Meyer.  Dr. Meyer stated that there was no such contention that 
Ulane, as a transsexual, would pose any sort of danger.  His only contention was that “the 
surgery was still experimental and not a cure for the underlying psychological 
problem.”69 
 Rather than Ulane presenting a threat to the safety of passengers and crew, Judge 
Grady believes that Eastern fashioned such an argument, taking an “attitude that its mind 
was made up from the beginning.”70  Eastern’s arguments convinced Capitan Shipner 
who, worried about someone taking hormones in the cockpit, stated, “If I knew someone 
was taking heroin, I would not let them in the cabin.”71  Yet when asked if his opinion 
would change if he knew more about the hormone Ulane was taking (Ovulen-21), he 
admitted that his fears would be alleviated.  Judge Grady believes that, rather than taking 
an “ostrich-like position,” Eastern should have been proactive in investigating the issues 
of transsexuality and educating its employees. 
 Framed as dangerous, Eastern’s arguments follow Foucault’s notion of the 
monster as always already a danger to the public.  Without any concrete evidence, it clear 
that the testimony from Captain Shipner is based on a biased opinion that paints Ulane as 
monstrous and deviant because of her “abnormal” drug regimen.  Further, as Dr. Meyer 
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points out, surgery is not meant to “cure” any underlying psychological problems.  Dr. 
Meyer’s testimony coupled with Captain Shipner’s also places Ulane in a split 
subjectivity, where the body and the mind are assumed to be connected, but also able to 
be treated separately.  Thus through her monstrous positioning coupled with the 
rhetorical lens of the Cartesian subject, Ulane is doubly positioned on the edge of reason 
and unreason.  Ulane’s position at the limit of subjectivity places her in the endless cycle 
that requires her to speak her own subjectivity for which she is assumed not to be able to 
speak.  Rather interpreters are called in to speak for her. 
 The second issue, the lack of an unconditional medical certificate, shows 
Eastern’s attempt to “drum up… adverse crew reaction” based on a psychological 
evaluation.  Ulane’s medical certificate at the time was substantially similar to that of an 
alcoholic, which required further review.  In testimony, Dr. Haynes believed that Ulane’s 
psychological condition did not affect her ability to fly or her ability to be left alone.  
Rather Dr. Haynes was concerned about ridicule on the part of the crew of Eastern 
Airlines.  Even after Ulane received an unconditional medical certificate from the Federal 
Flight Administration, Eastern did not change its position.  Dr. Hudson testified that the 
FAA’s decision was wrong, and that he “could never be convinced by any evidence 
whatsoever that plaintiff is fit to fly the airplane.”72 
 The “underlying psychological” condition, assumed “fixed” through reassignment 
surgery, is the third issue Judge Grady examines.  He finds that Eastern has “an 
articulation”73 problem here, because Eastern fails to connect the issue to safety.  Further, 
he notes, “that the surgery is not designed to cure anything.  The person after the surgery 
is still a transsexual.”74  Sex reassignment surgery is meant to help the patient lead a more 
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comfortable life, but the problem still remains.  Rather than look into Ulane’s particular 
case, Judge Grady finds that Eastern did nothing to address Ulane’s personal readiness, 
but rather categorically assumed that all transsexuals present a safety issue.75 
 While Judge Grady’s finding on problems two and three is helpful for Ulane, his 
rhetoric still functions within a system that provides him the ability to judge a proper 
subjectivity that is coded through an assumed split of the body/mind.  By admitting that 
sex reassignment surgery is meant to help the patient live more comfortably, he 
acknowledges that mind and body are connected; yet his rhetoric assumes a psychic 
interiority that can be treated through bodily means.  Moreover, the transsexual 
“problem” is never really alleviated.  Because Judge Grady, Dr. Meyer and Dr. Haynes 
assume that there is a psychic interiority, and that transsexuals’ bodies and psyches will 
never properly align, all of them effectively place Ulane as a subjectivity that will 
potentially never be on its own.  While Judge Grady is finding in favor of Ulane, his 
position as legal confessor and judge gives him the authority to decide Ulane’s subjective 
intelligibility. 
 Having decided that Ulane does not present a danger in the cockpit, Judge Grady 
finds Eastern’s claim that Ulane undermines Eastern’s efforts to assure the public that 
airline travel is safe to also be a pretext.  Eastern’s claim, based on the third issue, does 
not have any evidence.  Specifically, Judge Grady notes that this kind of argument is one 
“opponents of civil rights litigation urged back in those long-ago days when we did not 
have anti-discrimination laws.”76  Implicit in Eastern’s argument is that, if a transsexual 
were allowed to fly the plane, then no one would fly.  Further, as said above, framing 
Ulane as a danger deploys the trope of the dangerous transsexual.  The monstrous figure 
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of the transsexual, if allowed to actualize such a position of responsibility, is assumed to 
have dangerous and damaging effects for the company and its efforts to assure passenger 
safety. 
 Judge Grady believes Eastern’s final argument for termination in the letter to be 
the most discriminatory.  The notion that sex reassignment surgery changed Ulane from 
the person she was before, and that further Eastern would not have hired her, is 
undoubtedly flawed in reasoning.  It doesn’t align with Eastern’s argument that Ulane 
was a transvestite rather than a transsexual, and is “a virtual admission of 
discrimination.”77  According to Judge Grady, that discrimination is based on sex (in that 
Ulane’s changing of “sex” implies that she has a sex, whatever it may be, and that “was” 
the determining factor in her termination) and falls under Title VII. 
 While being the most discriminatory argument, it is also the most monstrous in 
scope.  Ulane is not only framed by Eastern Airlines as a monster through the notion of 
danger, but also as monster whose morphology has not only been altered, but is also 
always already perverse.  Though Eastern does not explicitly make the connection, 
implicit in its argument is that Ulane’s subjectivity is entirely unintelligible and therefore 
falls into unreason or madness.  In this particular argument we see the strongest binding 
of madness and monster, whose subjectivity is not only at the edge of reason, but also 
essentially dangerous.78 
 The second termination letter, sent in March of 1982, follows much the same line 
of reasoning.  Though slightly different from the first letter, Eastern’s still frames 
transsexuals – and Ulane in particular – as dangerous and untrustworthy.  In the first 
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letter Eastern simply claimed that Ulane was a danger in the cockpit, and at trial Captain 
Causey noted that the danger was about trust.  Yet the second letter notes that, because 
Ulane did not disclose her medications (out of fear of losing her job), that her “behavior 
shows a consistent pattern of poor judgment and willingness to endanger your fellow 
crew members and passengers for your own benefit.”79  While Eastern’s accusation of 
untruthfulness may indeed be legal, Judge Grady also believes it to be a pretext because 
of Eastern’s dissimilar treatment of “male alcoholics.”80  It appears that some Eastern 
pilots, for sometime, concealed their alcoholism.  These male pilots were never fired, yet 
Ulane was fired for not revealing her hormone treatment.  Judge Grady believes the sex 
difference to be at issue, and finds that Eastern’s decision was discriminatory. 
 Lastly, Eastern again states that Ulane’s presence would undermine their ability to 
assure the public of safe air travel.  But this time Eastern states, “This notoriety would 
undermine Eastern’s efforts to reassure passengers of the safety of airline 
transportation.”81  Eastern claims that Ulane’s position as a transsexual pilot would draw 
enough attention to threaten Eastern’s ability to ensure safety.  While Judge Grady does 
note that the press was in the courtroom at the time and that Ulane did make herself 
available for interview, he also notes that Ulane was not seeking attention. 
 Though not an explicit trope of the transsexual as defined in the last chapter, 
many doctors framed transsexual patients seeking the “sex change” operation Jorgensen 
had to be seeking fame and attention.  This particular framing serves to infantilize 
transsexual patients (emotionally immature enough to desire gratuitous attention) while 
also tying the fame-seeking transsexual to the unreliable transsexual narrator.  Just as 
Ulane was accused of conning her way into surgery, she was also accused of bringing 
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undue media attention to herself and to Eastern Airlines.  Judge Grady admits that she 
“has made her self available to the media”82 but believes that “She conducted herself 
properly”83 on television.  The newspaper articles and interest in the case, he notes, come 
from the “unusual or even unique […] character” of the case.84 
 Finding that all of Eastern’s arguments were pretexts, Judge Grady found in favor 
of Ulane, awarding her back pay85 and insisting that Eastern rehire Ulane as a Pilot.86  
However, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals over turned Judge Grady’s ruling in 
1984.87  In the appellate decision, the court argued that Judge Grady’s decision could not 
stand because of his interpretation of Title VII.  Citing its “responsibility… to interpret…  
congressional legislation and determine what Congress intended when it decided to 
outlaw discrimination based on sex,”88 the Court finds that Congress did not intend for 
Title VII to cover transsexuals, homosexuals, or transvestites.  “Words,” the court points 
out, “should be given their ordinary, common meaning,”89 which leads the court to 
interpret Title VII prohibiting discrimination “against women because they are women 
and against men because they are men.”90  The Court argues that Judge Grady did not 
prove that Eastern Considered Ulane to be a woman and legally discriminated against her 
because she was “a person who has a sexual identity disorder.”91 
 Perhaps more interesting in the appellate decision is the section concerning Ulane 
as a female.  Judge Grady, the Court argues, treated Ulane as if she were female.  Yet, the 
decision states, “even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created from what 
remains of a man, that does not decide this case.”92  Were Judge Grady able to cite 
evidence that Eastern treated Ulane as a female and discriminated against her based on 
her sex, then, the Court notes, Title VII would apply.  “It is clear from the evidence,” they 
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argue, “that if Eastern did discriminate against Ulane, it was not because she is female, 
but because Ulane is a transsexual – a biological male who takes female hormones, cross-
dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to make it appear female.”93   
 The decision of the appellate court leaves Ulane’s sex undecided.  By indicating 
that, should evidence be available that Eastern considered Ulane to be female Title VII 
would apply, the Court effectively leaves Ulane’s sex status as a question of social 
interpretation, rather than a legal matter.  It is clear from the appellate decision that the 
Court is faced with a subject that it cannot interpret – except that Title VII does not apply 
to her case.  The Court does not suggest that Ulane should be considered either male or 
female, nor does the Court suggest that being transsexual constitutes some third sex 
category.  Despite Ulane’s “proper” embodiment of femininity and her successful 
navigation of transsexual tropes, the judicial system, through the appellate court decision, 
still has a problem with Ulane’s interiority.  Despite being considered a woman socially 
(as both Judge Grady and the appellate court indicate), the Court renders Ulane 
unintelligible through their classification of her as having a sexual identity disorder.  
The Edge of Intelligibility 
 Because Ulane v. Eastern Airlines was overturned on appeal in 1984,94 the case 
does not fit exactly into the Liberal Moment that Meyerowitz describes in How Sex 
Changed.95  Yet the decision Judge Grady delivered highlights the ways in which judges 
could still apply a liberal interpretation of the law even amid the rise of the New Right of 
the 1980s.96  More importantly, Ulane showcases the joining of medico-psychological 
discourse and legal discourse.  Faced with a figure it cannot comprehend, the judicial 
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systems calls in medical and psychological “experts” to interpret transsexual subjectivity. 
Ulane's case demonstrates how transsexual tropes, informed by Cartesian subjectivity, aid 
in policing the borders of acceptable transsexual subjects. Ulane's case was more than her 
ability to uphold femininity. It was also about her ability to navigate those transsexual 
tropes that police the bounds of acceptable subjectivity. Ulane was called to demonstrate 
her "rational" mind and appearance against the various tropes that always already present 
the transsexual subject as suspect.  This linking of the discourses serves to undergird the 
power of both discursive parties: the medico-psychological field continues to be the 
“expert” on the treatment of transsexualism, while the judicial field – calling for 
interpretation – continues its power as confessor and judge. 
 The linking of medico-psychological discourse places transsexual subjectivity in a 
cycle that continuously asks that transsexual subjectivity be spoken and interpreted.  The 
Cartesian subject – rational and thinking – continues to frame subjectivity as divided into 
interiority/exteriority that, though treated separately, are linked and should properly align.  
If interior and exterior do not align, subjectivity is placed on the edge of intelligibility, a 
criminal madness that holds a “truth” that, once discovered, will rectify the dissonance.  
 In Barbin’s case, rectifying the dissonance (her external appearance and desire) 
meant forcing her to live as a man, a decision that ultimately led to her death.  With the 
rise of sexology, psychology and medicine more generally, finding the “truth” of 
hemaphroditism in the late 1800s translated into transsexuality in the 1950s with 
psychotherapy and surgery as the primary methods for easing the interior and exterior 
dissonance.97  Once the figure of the transsexual made its way into the court system in the 
1960s and ‘70s, courts called in medical “experts” to testify to the “condition” of the 
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transsexual in order to be able to decide how transsexuals should be considered legally 
and within the populace. 
 Further, as Ulane v. Eastern Airlines shows, the linking of medico-psychological 
and judicial discourse, while buttressing power, also provided a means of resistance to 
oppression for transsexual patients.  The “Liberal Moment” an outlet for transsexual 
subjects to push for rights with the hope of finding a sympathetic judge.  Thus the linking 
of discourses provided a space to argue for rights while forcing the judiciary to reconsider 
terms of “sex” and “gender” long held to have obvious meanings.  While the linking of 
discourse could undoubtedly be framed as repressive to transsexual and transgender 
persons, it is important to see the productive aspect of such linkages. 
 Despite the productive aspects of the linking of discourses, the assumption of a 
coherent interiority still needs to be questioned.  As Huffer points out, despite the 
advances of queer theory and queer activism, “Perhaps the greatest symptom of 
performativity’s [and queer theory’s] reliance on a conception of subjectivity that leaves 
unaddressed the historical rise of a moral subject is queer theory’s investment in the 
psyche.”98  I have attempted to show just how the assumption of a psychic interiority 
factors into the ways in which discourses of subjectivity are constructed and the way in 
which such discourses have very material realities.  Examining such a history, through 
the question of discourse linking and subjectivity helps us to rethink modes of rights 
seeking, queer theory and political activism more generally.
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COMING APART AT THE SEAMS: UNRAVELING THE CARTESIAN SUBJECT, 
CONTEMPORARY TRANS-  POLITICS AND THE ANXIETY OF LIBERATION 
 
One day, perhaps, we will no longer know what madness was.1 
  
 Following the work of Foucault for her research on queer theory and ethics, 
Lynne Huffer attempts to trace the effects of Cartesian subjectivity and its effects on 
queer subjectivity and ethics.  She argues Foucault critiqued the Cartesian subject 
throughout his work, starting first with History of Madness.  In his later work, Huffer 
notes, Foucault moved to an explicit critique of the State and its power that is both 
individualizing and totalizing, having the effect of creating a sameness for a populace, 
and yet an specific legal/ethical implication for the individual. 
 I have shown in the previous chapters how the medical community, starting in the 
mid-1800s in Europe (but especially after 1950 in America), created a method for 
transsexuality.   The medical community in the mid- to late-1800s believed that the mind 
and body had a reciprocal relationship, yet as rationalism and professionalization 
increased in the U.S., the medical community moved increasingly away from the mind in 
favor of the body.  The split of the medical and psychological communities at the turn of 
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the twentieth century, coupled with the rise of sexology, paved the institutional way for 
the creation of the transsexual subject. 
 Given the gender “problem” of the transsexual in the 1950s, sexology began to 
question what constituted one’s “sex.”  With the advent of sex reassignment surgery, it 
was only a matter of time before the state became concerned with defining a transsexual 
person’s sex.  Through interactions with the courts, the judicial system again had to 
address the definition of sex and common assumptions about sex written into state and 
federal statutes.  As I demonstrated in chapter two, the courts called in the medical 
profession, asking them to step in to define and speak on the behalf of transsexual 
subjects.  In doing so, the medical community brought in many tropes about transsexual 
subjects, many of which were the vestiges of the war between the medical and 
psychological communities over the treatment of transsexualism that lasted until the late 
1970s.  These figures or tropes, as I have argued, were constituted as mad, and thereby 
accusing a transsexual subject of failing to hold to a Cartesian standard of subjectivity. 
 I believe that there are (at the very least) still vestiges of postmodernism lingering 
in our cultural memory – now more than ever in an ever-globalizing and post-9/11 
American milieu.  The figure of the transsexual, as I have explained, took many twists 
and turns through the medical and psychological fields, and into other state institutions 
and discursive fields.  Thus the figure of the transsexual (transgender, trans-) is 
postmodern not only because of its transcendence of gender binaries, but also because of 
its complex weaving through multiple fields, both professional and otherwise, while 
opening up subjectivity to a certain amount of play.  While it would be easy to examine 
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other discursive fields, the Law perhaps best shows the joining and splitting of discursive 
fields and the further fracturing of identity. 
 Despite the efforts of various institutions to contain the ‘problem’ of 
transsexuality and transgenderism, there seems to be – at least within the law and on the 
level of the state more generally – hints at the unraveling of the Cartesian subject. Similar 
the current reappropriation of gays and lesbians within the nationalist framework of the 
American nation-state,2 it seems that trans- figures are on their way to becoming an 
appropriated American subjectivity.  Recently, trans-identified persons have been making 
headlines because of their appointment to “respected” local and state institutions.  Stu 
Rasmussen is believed to be the first trans-identified mayor in the nation as he unseated 
incumbent Ken Hector in Silverton, Oregon,3 and in 2010, Amanda Simpson made 
history by becoming the first trans-identified presidential appointee to the Department of 
Commerce.4  California voters recently appointed Victoria Kolakowski, who is the first 
openly trans-identified judge, to the Alameda County Superior Court.5   The fact that 
trans-identified persons are gaining state and nationally recognized positions seems to 
indicate that trans subjectivity is moving out of the margins of society and into the 
mainstream of acceptable bodily subjectivities.  Or more simply put, it seems that trans- 
subjectivities are being appropriated for the national body politic. 
 But what does it mean to be (re)appropriated?  And what does it mean for trans- 
experience and subjectivity/identity?  I have shown how the birth of the transsexual 
subject required conceptions of sex, gender, and sexuality, a Cartesian subject that 
consists of an inside and outside, as well as authoritative institutions.  Further, I have 
demonstrated how identities born of such circumstances are both reduced and multiplied 
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to stereotypes that are utilizable in other discursive fields through (sometimes temporary) 
linkages of discursive fields and practice.  In a way, the flattening and multiplying of 
subjective identities provides for easy understanding and appropriation (both negatively 
and positively) on the state and federal levels.  Bringing aberrations back into the fold, 
while seemingly positive and inclusionary, has stark implications for the regulation of 
society.  While there is the effect of bringing marginalized persons into the mainstream of 
society, the appropriation of certain “errant” bodies causes a further fracturing and 
marginalization of already marginalized bodies of people.  The marginalization of other 
“others” is, in itself, another type of appropriation, a continued containment device that 
allows institutional and state systems to easily identify, maintain, and subject subjects to 
an increasingly scrutinizing gaze of power. 
 The trans- community is no exception.  The diverse trans- community is, as it has 
been historically, further splitting into bodies that do and do not count.  The Ulane case 
discussed in chapter two shows that adherence to the Cartesian mode of subjectivity (with 
a little corrective help from the medical community) allows the judicial field to maintain 
social order through rewarding those subjects who correctly uphold the sex/gender/desire 
matrix.  As Anna Kirkland argues, Ulane won her initial case because of her ability to 
adhere to the standards of femininity.6  Further, as I have argued, the play of stereotypes 
that rely on the Cartesian subject further police the borders of acceptable subjects.  As 
state institutions continues to use technologies of Cartesianism, with increasing 
surveillance and an ever-heightening and constricting standard of normal, “aberrant” 
trans-identified subjects that do not meet the standard of a properly rectified subject will 
be further fractured from their “normalized” counterparts. 
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 For example, a New York Times article from 2011 indicates that two trans-
identified persons have filed suit against New York City at the New York Supreme 
Court, contesting that current policy requiring “corrective surgery” before a birth 
certificate can be changed.7  The plaintiffs argue that surgery is costly, often not covered 
by insurance, and requiring surgery does not account for a person’s inner feelings of 
gender or gender perception.  Those who do not comply with corrective surgery are 
subjected to embarrassing moments, looks of suspicion and humiliation.  Their argument 
highlights how those who “properly” embody a “corrected” transsexual have access to 
state recognition of their sex status, while those who are unwilling or unable to have 
surgery are pushed further towards the margins. 
 In the twenty years since the Ulane case, American society has become an ever-
increasing surveillance state that is willing to go to great lengths to police the borders of 
bodies that count in the American populace.  Our bureaucratic state has become, since 
WWII, increasingly better at knowing and maintaining its population, even to the point of 
directing sexual matters and personal expression.  While recent cases such as Lawrence v. 
Texas seem to provide liberties for subjects (gay and lesbian subjects in the Lawrence 
case), there is an increased proximity of the state that provides for state control over 
sexual expression and freedom that falls according to lines of class, race, nationality, etc.8 
 Despite increasing surveillance from the state, it seems that the state’s ability to 
use stable categories that uphold the Cartesian subject is becoming increasingly difficult.  
For example, consider the Florida case of Kantaras v. Kantaras in 2004.9  Originally 
from Ohio, Michael Kantaras had sex reassignment surgery in Texas at the Rosenberg 
Clinic in 1987.  Michael met Linda in 1988 and the couple married in Florida in 1989.  In 
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1998 Michael filed for divorce in Florida, but Linda counterpetitioned stating that the 
marriage was void ab initio because Michael was really female.  Under Florida’s statues 
on marriage (defined as between a man and a woman) the appellate court found in favor 
of Linda, citing that Michael was not considered a man for “the purposes of the marriage 
statues”10 despite Michael’s various other interactions (past, present, and presumably 
continuing) with the state as a legal man. 
 Florida’s decision in the Kantaras case, while explicitly dealing with marriage 
statutes, and same-sex marriage in particular, has far reaching effects for Michael.  The 
initial decision, which found in favor of Michael, cited his myriad interactions with both 
local and state governments as a man to bolster the court’s argument that Michael was 
indeed a man at the time of the marriage.  While the appellate court does not deny 
Michael’s various interactions (including legal name change and the modification of his 
birth certificate), it reversed the initial decision using the language that effectively leaves 
Michael’s legal gender in question.  By arguing that, for the purposes of marriage, 
Michael cannot be considered a man, the court throws (though does not rule on) the 
legality of Michael’s other interactions with the state into question, leaving his full legal 
gender in question.  
 The decision in the case exemplifies the effects of increasing surveillance and the 
implications of close government regulation of acceptable bodies.  Such regulation, 
coupled with the nationalistic desire of exemplary inclusion, creates fractures of 
subjectivity that cannot be maintained.  Treated as one sex in Ohio, treated as another sex 
in Texas, and effective ungendered in Florida highlights the fracturing nature of 
subjectivity vis-à-vis trans-identified persons.  Such a perplexed state leaves the 
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individual feeling singled out (not to mention the material reality of such a subjectivity) 
while policing the borders – both physical/geographical and metaphysically – of the 
bodies that count in the nation-state.  If citizenship is taken to mean belonging to a 
national body of law-abiding persons with similar conceptions of what it means to belong 
to a certain group of subjects, rights, freedoms, and the meaning of citizenship, then 
Michael is (at least on the state level) a non-citizen because of his “confused” sex status 
between states.  
 I mention the Kantaras case here to point out the implications of Cartesian 
subjectivity and its unraveling.  I see these implications as an expansion of the totalizing 
and individualizing effects that Foucault describes in “Omnes et Singulatum.”11  Through 
such contact with the state and the judiciary, a non-acceptable trans-identified subject is 
hailed as an individual in that s/he is subject to individual punishment (in the sense of the 
denial of citizenship rights) enacted by the state and judiciary.  Our belief in a 
fundamental “nature” of a “natural” inside (mind) and outside (body), while once 
contestable in previous decades, has become increasingly entrenched to the point that 
“sex” is always already what is “naturally” assigned at birth.  Yet with no federal 
standard regarding the rights of trans-identified subjects, the states are left to legislate 
statues regarding the ability to obtain sex reassignment surgery, the ability to change birth 
certificates, and discrimination based on gender history or perceived gender incoherence. 
 Such punishment – or the denial of certain citizenship rights in a confusing 
manner from state to state – creates a totalizing effect in two ways: 1) it is totalizing for 
the individual in that judgment passed appears total and final, and 2) it is totalizing for 
the populace in that such punishment serves to police the borders of acceptable 
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subjectivities not only for trans-identified persons, but also for the citizenry more 
generally.  Despite the increased visibility of trans-identified persons in government 
positions (which seemingly indicates inclusivity and imminent liberation), state 
institutions, though their use of “proper” transsexual bodies that fit the heteronormal 
matrix, continue to enact technologies of Cartesianism that bring some bodies into the 
national populace while pushing others who do not conform to the same “normative” 
standard further towards the margins. 
 The state cannot, as we see with Kantaras v. Kantaras continue to have totalizing 
effects in a singular fashion, as was the case with identities prior to the mid-1900s.  
Instead, the postmodern age provides for the shifting center of the “abnormal” discourses.  
I believe that, as the borders of acceptable bodies are policed using the Cartesian subject 
as the standard (and negative tropes or stereotypes that refer to the standard), the system 
will become more difficult to maintain.  The state’s increased proximity to queer bodies 
is producing an onus for both the individual and the state itself.  State surveillance of 
queer bodies (to the extent that we have witnessed since 9/11) is so vast that the sheer 
expense and manpower required – not to mention the agitation from the public, 
lobbyists/activists and marginalized populations – are taking a toll.  There will be a 
recentering of discourse, one that accepts some trans-indentified bodies into society while 
further marginalizing others.   
 As Derrida indicates, the endless play or recentering of discourse over time is a 
positive aspect of discourse that allows for new concepts and ideas to emerge.  Yet, as 
there has been more generally with postmodernism, this play, while liberatory, can 
produce anxiety: anxiety about stability, change, and the opening up of new pathways of 
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understanding.  With this sense of anxiety, trans-identified subjects coming into the 
national body is no doubt a concern for conservatives.  There is, however, another kind of 
anxiety that is rarely examined in transgender politics.  With the current political situation 
of the United States, with social issues dominating political discourse, there needs to be 
an examination about the anxiety of liberty. 
 Anxiety of liberty is the unease produced through trading increased state 
intervention for “liberties” that are supposedly for an entire “class” of people.  While 
gays and lesbians have made such federal achievements, there is, for now, few 
protections and provisions for trans-identified persons from either the state or federal 
level.  As with same-sex marriage, the courts have left trans- issues to individual states, 
further providing for increased legal confusion and marginalization.  The linking of 
institutions through trans- subjectivity, coupled with activism, will eventually press the 
trans-identified subject back to the federal level, and again creating anxiety over the 
amount of state involvement in the lives of trans-identified subjects and their ability to 
transition and express themselves as they see fit.  This anxiety producing interaction, 
while providing some with a bit of liberty, also, over time, allows for the recntering of 
what we believe to be “abnormal.”  As we are seeing now, for example, Americans are 
becoming more accepting of gays and lesbians, shifting what we believe to be 
“abnormal.” 
 Focus on the Cartesian subject allows for another, broader, perspective on the 
recentering and play of subjectivity and the framing of abnormality. Further, as trans- 
persons continue to undermine stereotypes and seek litigation from the courts while 
lobbying legislators, the fissures in the system will become more apparent, and try as the 
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state might, the system will recenter, again allowing for increased inclusion, but never 
leaving the dialectical system which leaves a few stones still unturned.  Examining the 
process of state involvement with trans- subjectivities through Cartesianism allows us to 
see the broader effects of lobbying for liberties through state channels.  Further, the 
examination aids in the development of new methods of seeking out and exploiting the 
fissures in the system to the advantage of marginalized subjectivities.  
 Perhaps Foucault was right in believing that we will one day “no longer know 
what madness was.”  Such a simple statement can be misleading, especially when 
madness is framed as a subjectivity.  Perhaps, put another way, our conception of what 
constitutes madness will change (as it has historically) so that what we diagnose as 
madness today will indeed be “normal” in the future.  The thought seems liberating and, I 
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